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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate whether government transparency has an 
independent effect on environmental performance. Transparency is being promoted by 
policymakers and international institutions alike as a key feature of good governance with 
the potential to enhance environmental performance. The question that remains is whether 
transparency alone can reach these ambitious objectives, or if enabling factors are needed to 
enhance the effect of transparency. This thesis investigated the direct effect of transparency 
but also whether it can be said to have an indirect effect by decreasing corruption, an issue 
which is known for its negative impacts on environmental performance. This thesis 
employed principal-agent theory, which is the main theoretical explanation for the alleged 
success of transparency. To investigate whether transparency is more efficient with enabling 
factors in place three such enabling factors were suggested that might enhance the effect of 
transparency by empowering potential principals with information. These factors were a 
strong civil society, an educated population and openness to trade. The method used was a 
large-N cross-country statistical investigation, employing Ordinary Least Squares 
Regressions to examine the relationship between government transparency and 
environmental performance. Interactions were subsequently included to investigate the 
potential effect of enabling factors.  
The results can be summarized in three main points. First, the result suggest that 
transparency does not have an independent effect on environmental performance. Second, 
the enabling factors suggested do not possess the strength to generate an effect and third, 
the hypothesis regarding the indirect effect receives some support. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“There can be no faith in government if our highest offices are excused from scrutiny - They should be setting 
the example of transparency” 
 
Edward Snowden 
Climate change and environmental degradation have become key concerns for economic 
growth and human development. The world has seen an increased awareness of the fragility 
of nature and the problems connected to ecosystem destruction. The impacts of 
environmental devastation are felt across the globe but with a disproportionate intensity in 
poor developing countries, where the reliance on natural resources often is high (Ölund 
Wingqvist, Drakenberg, Sjöstedt, Slunge, & Ekbom, 2012). Effectively managing the 
environment and implementing protective legislation have therefore become a top priority 
on the international agenda and is addressed by governments, NGOs and international 
organisations.  
The pressing need for environmental protection and the failure of previous attempts of 
environmental management through command and control efforts have led to a shift in 
management techniques from technical solutions in favour of governance measures (Ölund 
Wingquist et al., 2012). Within this shift, transparency has gained a prominent position in 
matters of environmental governance. Transparency is believed to increase accountability, 
generate participation and enable detection of malpractice. The theoretical pathway in which 
transparency prompts change is through principal-agent framework where the agents are 
believed to act in a self-maximising way unless under scrutiny of the principal. 
Transparency, supposedly, enhances accountability by decreasing the information 
asymmetry between the principals and the agents (Florini, 2002).  
With regard to environmental governance, transparency has gained its position mostly 
through the theoretical promise of its effectiveness (Gupta & Mason, 2014) and is promoted 
by international organisations such as the World Bank (2016), the International Monetary 
Fund (2016) and the United Nations (1992). Government transparency theoretically provide 
citizens (principals) with information on the actions of public officials (agents), and thereby 
enable citizens to hold government officials responsible for mismanagement of 
environmental resources. There is consequently a possibility that transparency has an 
independent direct effect on environmental performance, but there is also a possibility that 
the effect of transparency is dependent on enabling factors being in place. Since the 
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theoretical explanation for the alleged positive effect of transparency mostly build on 
principal-agent theory, factors that strengthens the abilities of principals could potentially 
enhance the effect of transparency. An engaged citizenry is more likely to demand 
information, an educated citizenry has a higher potential of interpreting information and 
openness to trade offers the possibility of additional principals. It is therefore possible that 
these three factors have the ability to enhance the effect of transparency.  
An alternative explanation for the possible effect of transparency could be that it effects 
environmental performance by decreasing corruption, an issue known for its negative impact 
on the environment (Peh & Drori, 2010). This would suggest that transparency has an 
indirect effect on environmental performance and that the effect runs through corruption. 
To this point, the promotion of transparency in the environmental field is mostly based on 
the theoretical promise of its qualities (Gupta & mason, 2014). However, the fact that 
transparency makes environmental information obtainable does not, in itself, guarantee that 
the information will be utilized by citizens to hold government officials accountable. Despite 
the promotion of transparency as an enhancer of environmental performance no large-N 
cross-country studies examine the actual substantial impacts of transparency concerning the 
environment. There exists a strong theoretical link, but this link is yet to be tested 
empirically. The contribution of this thesis is therefore to investigate the effect of 
transparency on environmental performance across a large sample of countries to determine 
if the theoretical direct link receives empirical support, or if enabling factors are needed for 
transparency to have desired effects. 
The results of this research can be summarized in three main points. First, the result 
suggest that transparency does not have an independent effect on environmental 
performance. Second, the enabling factors suggested do not possess the strength to generate 
an effect and third, the hypothesis regarding the indirect effect receives some support. 
1.1 Purpose of the Thesis  
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether transparency (both de facto and de jure) 
has an independent effect on environmental performance or if in fact the effectiveness of 
transparency is dependent upon, or enhanced by, enabling factors such as an active civil 
society, education or openness to trade. The main aim of this essay is to investigate the 
direct effect of transparency, but it will also examine the potential of transparency to 
demonstrate an indirect effect by influencing corruption levels. A large-N cross country 
investigation will be utilized employing Ordinary Least Squares Regression with interaction 
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effects. The aim, specific research questions and hypotheses will be developed further in 
chapter five but the main research question guiding this essay is: What effect does transparency 
have on environmental performance? 
1.2 Disposition  
The essay will proceed as follows; chapter two will begin with a short background that 
discusses the promotion of transparency by different actors but also develops the separation 
between de facto and de jure transparency. In chapter three, the theoretical foundation 
linking transparency to environmental performance will be deliberated. The section will, 
beyond offering a definition and conceptualization of transparency, focus much attention to 
the arguments behind the effectiveness of transparency and especially principal-agent 
theory. The theory section will also develop the concept of transparency and its usage across 
different disciplines and it will address possible enabling factors such as civil society 
participation, education and openness to trade. Chapter four will then delve into previous 
research and discuss the two ways in which previous research have connected transparency 
to environmental performance, mainly as a tool for good governance and as an anti-
corruption measure. Chapter five will present the aim of the thesis and the chosen research 
questions along with hypotheses. Chapter six will discuss the chosen method and provide 
limitations and strengths with utilizing a large-N cross-country investigation using 
interactions. The reasoning behind the chosen data and operationalization of variables will 
also be developed. Chapter seven will then display the results alongside the analysis and 
argue for a non-existing independent effect of transparency on environmental performance. 
Chapter eight will finish with a discussion, a conclusion and ideas for ways forward.  
2. Background  
In order to understand why it is imperative to investigate the effect of transparency this 
chapter will present a brief overview of different policy actors and institutions promotion of 
transparency as an enhancer of environmental performance. The chapter will also include a 
discussion on the separation between de jure and de facto transparency.  
The aim of this thesis is to fill a gap in the research field regarding actual substantial effects 
that potentially stem from transparency. An empirical investigation is vital due to the 
widespread promotion of transparency as an enhancer of environmental performance, by 
governments, NGOs, international financial institutions and international organisations 
alike. The promotion of transparency can be connected to what seems to be a shift in the 
debate regarding environmental performance where technical solutions are deprioritized in 
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favour of governance measures. With the enhancement of governance measures, 
transparency has become an international norm (Ölund Wingqvist et al., 2012: Bauhr & 
Nasiritousi, 2012), that is advocated by diverse actors such as the Swedish Environmental 
Protection Agency, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the World Bank (WB) and the 
United Nations (UN). 
According to The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency environmental performance 
will be most efficiently enhanced through a national level focus on good governance 
measures. These measures should be connected to the output side of the governance system, 
with transparency being one such output (Ölund Wingquist et al., 2012). The agency states 
that “There is now a growing consensus emphasising that governance has a strong effect on 
environmental actions and outcomes. Rule of law, citizens’ rights of access to information, 
public participation and equal access to justice is a basis for poverty reduction and 
sustainable development” (Ölund Wingqvist et al., 2012, p. 12).  
Transparency is, according to the IMF (2016), a precondition for good governance and an 
important aspect of efficient environmental policies. The IMF has included efforts towards 
greater transparency in management of natural resources in their conditionality for loans 
(IMF, 2016). The same priorities can be seen in the WB’s policy recommendations, where 
the new environmental and social framework, which is a framework of requirements for 
borrowers, are developing the existing agendas on transparency and accountability. This 
new framework aims at strengthening environmental and social development in borrowing 
countries and two of its key features are increased transparency alongside increased 
accountability (World Bank, 2016). Through its incorporation in the environmental and 
social framework, transparency has become a stipulation for borrowers.  
The United Nations have actively promoted transparency since the Rio Conference in 1992 
where principle 10 states that the environment is best preserved with participation of all 
citizens. States should therefore make environmental information available in order to 
encourage public participation (United Nations, 1992). This principle was further 
strengthened through the Aarhus Convention of 1998 where government transparency and 
accountability composed key features of the constitution (UNECE, n.d). The Aarhus 
Convention argues for countries to ensure public access to environmental information held 
by the public authorities. 
Transparency evidently enjoys a high status with a range of different actors concerned with 
environmental performance. In some of the examples above, such as the Swedish 
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Environmental Protection Agency and the WB, transparency is discussed as a part of a 
governance package including factors such as accountability. Nevertheless, there is no 
further description of how transparency might achieve these ambitious objectives but the 
positive effects of transparency seem to be taken for granted, possibly due to its theoretical 
promise of decreased information asymmetry. Something I will return to in section 3.2. 
Transparency can, as with any reform effort, be measured in two ways, namely de jure and de 
facto. De jure implies the legislated framework for transparency, while de facto describes the 
actual existence of transparency. The drive for transparency, outlined above, has resulted in 
the emergence of Access To Information (ATI) laws which is a de jure measure for achieving 
increased transparency. In the 1980s only a handful of countries had enacted such laws 
(Banisar, 2005) but now, in 2017, over one hundred countries have incorporated freedom of 
information into their legislation (Global Right to Information Rating, n.d). Sweden was the 
first country to do so already in 1766, but the real boost in ATI laws came after World War 
II (Banisar, 2005). According to Banisar (2005) some countries enact ATI laws as a sign of 
good faith but with no intention of fully implementing them. It can therefore be said to exist 
a discrepancy, or implementation gap, between de jure transparency, with the enactment of 
ATI laws, and de facto transparency, which is the actual level of transparency in the country.    
The promotion of transparency described above concerns both de jure and de facto. When 
the IMF and the WB promote transparency, and include it as a condition for loans it is 
mainly a question of generating stronger de facto transparency. However, when this is done 
through offering technical assistance and legal advice it translates into de jure efforts (IMF, 
2016; World Bank, 2016). Regarding the UN and the Aarhus Convention, transparency is 
endorsed as a goal for governments and it is encouraged to be reached through legal 
frameworks. Parties to the Convention, such as the European Union, therefore promote the 
enactment of ATI laws in member states (European Commission, 2017). 
Despite the lack of empirical research regarding the actual substantive effects of 
transparency on environmental performance, the concept is raised as a notable feature of 
environmental governance (Ölund Wingquist et al., 2012; SDG Knowledge Hub, 2015). 
Transparency, both de jure and de facto, needs to undergo scrutiny to establish if the 
prominent position is merited, and the possible discrepancy between de jure and de facto 
transparency needs to be considered. This essay will therefore contribute further insights on 
this area. 
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3. Theoretical Framework 
This section will develop the theoretical framework that constitutes the basis from which 
testable implications are drawn out. The section will start with a discussion on the definition 
and conceptualization of transparency in order to establish the meaning of the concept in 
this dissertation. Thereafter, the importance of transparency in different disciplines will be 
deliberated in order to display the wide usage and endorsement of the concept. 
Subsequently, the argument for the connection between transparency and environmental 
performance will be deliberated, a connection that is theorized to be both direct and indirect. 
The discussion will start at a global level and subsequently move to state level, which is 
where this research is located. The section also incorporates a discussion on three possible 
enabling factors for the effectiveness of transparency, which are an active civil society, 
education and openness to trade.      
3.1 Conceptualizing Transparency  
Scholars have argued that we now live in an era of transparency where access to information 
is seen as a human right (Gupta & Mason, 2014; Kravchenko, 2010). Transparency is 
discussed as a solution to a diverse set of economic, political and ethical problems in a range 
of disciplines (Gupta & Mason, 2014). Despite this growing call for transparency in both 
public and private sectors, definitional precision is still lacking and the concept of 
transparency is sometimes equated with accountability, good governance, rule of law or 
public participation which confuses the operationalization of the concept (Gupta & Mason, 
2014; Michener & Bersch, 2013).   
In the debate regarding what constitutes transparency, the concept is often connected to 
openness and reduced secrecy which is to be reached through availability of information. 
The direct meaning of transparency is “rendering visible” or “seeing through” but if 
transparency is just treated as visibility then notable features such as what is to be rendered 
visible and for whom is left out of the equation (Gupta & Mason, 2014, p. 5). Many scholars 
use the definition provided by Ann Florini as a point of departure for inquiry. Florini (2007) 
defines transparency as “the release of information which is relevant for evaluating 
institutions”. This broad description offers a possibility for both public and private 
institutions to use the same definition. Another commonly used definition is; “the increased 
flow of timely and reliable economic, social and political information which is accessible to 
all relevant stakeholders” (Williams, 2015, p. 805).  
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An alternative effort to conceptualize transparency is made by Greg Michener & Katherine 
Bersch (2013), who argue that an agreed upon definition within the research community is 
essential or policies will be built on weak conceptual grounds and evaluations of 
transparency policies will miss their target. The authors claim that in order to identify and 
evaluate transparency two conditions are needed; “visibility of information and inferability 
(the potential to draw accurate conclusions from it)” (Michener & Bersch, 2013, p. 234). 
Visibility, as in the presence of information, has been a central pillar of transparency since 
the concept was first used in academic circles, whilst inferability is an emerging component.  
The many suggested definitions of transparency have exposed it to conceptual stretching 
and, by following the reasoning of Sartori (1970), “increasing the concept’s extension 
diminishes the words intention, or specificity” (Michener & Bersch, 2013, p. 237). This 
statement is not agreed upon by everyone and a universal definition of transparency might, 
according to some scholars, not be desirable. Paul Langley (2001) states that “the vague and 
elusive nature of transparency is itself an important feature of its growing importance” (p. 
75-76). Transparency is utilised over a range of structures of governance and it takes on 
different meaning depending on the context. If a universal definition is used there is a risk of 
omitting important features of the concept (Langley, 2001). Michener & Bersch (2013), on 
the other hand, argue that to empirically investigate transparency and its effects it is 
important to agree as to what transparency is and what it is not.  
The definition of transparency applied in this essay is the one presented by Florini (2007); 
“the release of information which is relevant for evaluating institutions”. The 
conceptualization of transparency that was utilized in this essay is one suggested by Marcia 
Grimes and Monika Bauhr (2016). Grimes and Bauhr (2016) build on the idea of visibility 
and inferability but argue that in order to account for situational specifics an empirical 
investigation of transparency must include the purpose of the information and the intended 
users i.e. the principals (Grimes & Bauhr, 2016), something I will return to in section 6.1: 
Operationalization of Variables. This essay will also distinguish between de jure and de facto 
transparency, as explained previously.  
3.2 Transparency in Different Disciplines 
As noted in the previous section, transparency is a concept that is used across many different 
disciplines. Its importance is highlighted in diverse areas of literature such as security, 
economics, regime effectiveness and good governance literature. Florini (2002) claims that 
information is the base upon which democratic and market based societies rest. Without 
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information citizens and stakeholders would not feel safe in voting and investing and 
therefore, Florini (2002) argues, the goal of good governance should be transparency. 
Florini (2002) has focused much attention towards transparency and security and claims 
that nations have increased the use of transparency as a tool to persuade others that it is not 
a threat. By embracing transparency and being open about their military capability, 
countries are perceived as less threatening. Military security, an issue area that was once 
dependent on secrecy, has in many cases embraced the notion of transparency as an 
instrument for security through openness. In economics, the role of transparency is creating 
a predictable environment that encourages investment. If stakeholders obtain information 
on the activities of companies and the state they will feel more inclined to enter the market 
(Stiglitz, 2002; Florini, 2002). Regarding the field of regime effectiveness, the importance of 
transparency exists in the regime’s ability to learn from previous progress and alter state 
behavior. “To effectively alter the behavior of states and substate actors, regimes (or the 
states that compose them) must either have–or create–information about the activities they 
seek to regulate and the impact of those activities on the ultimate goals of the regime” 
(Mitchell, 1998, p. 111). Information is needed to assess how well the regime is doing and 
furthermore, it is vital in creating the foundation for the regime to do better in the future 
(Mitchell, 1998). Lastly, transparency enjoys a distinct status as a key feature of good 
governance. Defining governance is not simple since an agreed upon definition is still lacking 
in the research community. However, it is often connected to how power is exercised. 
Governance includes participation from citizens and their ability to influence decision making 
and the distribution of authority. Good Governance consequently entails aspects of enhancing 
participation, strengthening effectiveness of government institutions, promoting 
transparency, rule of law and most of all accountability. Transparency is often described as 
the tool by which to reach accountability, which explains the importance of the concept in 
good governance literature (Ölund Wingquist et al., 2012).     
It is evident that transparency plays an influential role in several different disciplines and in 
order to understand how transparency works in these different disciplines and the reason for 
its importance, it is vital that the pathway by which transparency informs change is 
elaborated. Principal-agent theory is the most commonly used explanation of the pathway in 
which transparency supposedly results in better governance. Principal-agent theory is based 
on two key assumptions:  
“(1) that a goal conﬂict exists between so-called principals (who are typically 
assumed to embody the public interest) and agents (who are assumed to have a 
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preference in favour of corrupt transactions insofar as the beneﬁts of such 
transactions outweigh the costs) and  
(2) that agents have more information than the principals, which results in an 
information asymmetry between the two groups of actors”  
(Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 2013, p. 452).  
Principle-agent dilemma can be seen in both governments and corporations where the 
government (agent) is responsible for acting in a manner that benefits the citizens 
(principals) and the corporate managers (agents) are responsible for acting in a manner that 
benefits the shareholders (principals). Public choice theory claims that government officials 
will not, at all times, serve the interest of the public since they continuously face incentives 
to increase their own power (Florini, 2002). An information asymmetry can therefore be said 
to exist between the agent and the principal, where the agent possesses more information 
than the principal since the agent alone knows how they will act. The reason why 
transparency theoretically leads to better governance is by decreasing the information 
asymmetry between the principals and the agents. Transparency will enable detection of bad 
practice and mismanagement amongst the agents and allow the principals to hold the agents 
accountable for such measures (Florini, 2002). What the theory fails to address, and 
therefore by extension what research on transparency sometimes fails to address, is whether 
access to information in itself is enough to generate accountability through citizen 
monitoring. I will return to this when discussing enabling factors for transparency induced 
change in sections 3.3.1.1 – 3.3.1.3. With the importance and diverse applicability of 
transparency in different disciplines established we now turn to the focus of this dissertation, 
namely transparency and environmental performance.  
3.3 Transparency and Environmental Performance 
The purpose of this essay is to investigate whether transparency can be said to have an 
independent effect on environmental performance, that is whether there exists a direct link 
between the two. This subsection will therefore develop the theories connecting these two 
concepts, starting at a global level and moving down to a national level which is where this 
research is focused.  
Global environmental politics have become an expression that highlights the international 
character of many environmental problems, such as climate change and biodiversity loss 
(Duit, Feindt, & Meadowcroft, 2015). The international character of environmental 
problems has led to research prioritizing international environmental governance that 
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underscores the importance of non-state actors, NGOs and international institutions such as 
the European Union. The frequent use of the term “governance”, in discussions regarding 
environmental issues, is proof of this multi-level focus. “Governance” is not “government” 
and implies a multi-stakeholder approach where environmental problems require targeting 
diverse levels - global, regional, national and local - by different stakeholders and groups 
(Gupta & Mason, 2014).  
Aarti Gupta & Michael Mason (2014) argue that the globalization of environmental 
governance has seen a transparency turn where transparency is used as a way of governing, 
namely by “governance by disclosure” (p. 6). This implies that transparency is used to target 
disclosure of information to steer behaviour, something that is also done at national level. 
The governance by disclosure tool aims at improving certain behaviour by making that 
behaviour visible, for example pollution levels of countries and enterprises (Gupta & Mason, 
2014). Gupta and Mason (2014) investigate this type of transparency based governance 
(governance by disclosure) and its effects on environmental performance. They start their 
inquiry by considering the theoretical explanations for the importance of transparency in 
global environmental governance, namely that transparency enhances empowerment and 
participation together with informed choice in decision-making. Transparency theoretically 
strengthens global environmental governance through enhancement of efficiency, enabling 
of cooperation and coordination and thereby effectiveness. The increase in efficiency 
attributed to transparency is due to the widespread opinion that governance by disclosure is 
more efficient than market-based approaches or command and control efforts that have been 
part of previous strategies of environmental governance. Gupta and Mason (2014) argue 
that the promotion of transparency in environmental governance is mostly based on 
normative claims on its efficiency. Despite the scrutiny that has been directed towards 
transparency in other disciplines, the authors argue that the impact of transparency in the 
environmental field has escaped closer examination. A statement that receives support from 
the lack of empirical studies investigating the direct substantial effects of transparency in 
this field. 
The nature of environmental issues as global problems affecting every individual on the 
planet has placed the focus on research on the international arena but also at the individual 
and local level. At the local level, the research conducted by Elinor Ostrom on common pool 
resource management has displayed the importance of cooperation within and across 
communities and individual level is addressed through research on consumer behaviour 
(Duit et al. 2015).  
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The focus of a considerable amount of research on global, local or individual level is 
problematic since it is still the nation state that holds the legislative authority and power to 
enforce laws, and, thereby, the means to address and solve many of the problems connected 
to environmental performance. One scholar that argues for the importance of bringing the 
state back into environmental governance research is Andreas Duit et al. (2015). States 
uphold legal frameworks and they have the ability to shape economic, social and political 
interactions in a legitimate manner. States have set the foundation upon which 
environmental management rests and states are also the signatories of important 
international agreements regarding environmental protection. Again, connecting to the 
Aarhus Convention, the nation state holds the power to legislate on access to information 
which is one of the central pillars of the Convention. The nation state is therefore still highly 
important with regards to environmental performance. Duit et al. (2015) discusses the 
components of, what he terms, the environmental state and argues for the need of more 
research on the potential of the environmental state to create substantive positive effects on 
environmental performance (Duit et al. 2015, p. 7).  
Following the reasoning of Duit et al. (2015), and attempting to contribute further 
knowledge on the capability of government transparency, this study will investigate the 
ability of the state to produce improved environmental performance through transparency 
measures. Looking at the national level and the theories on how transparency affects 
environmental performance two ways can be discerned, a direct- and an indirect effect. The 
focus of this study is on the direct effect of transparency but I will also, in the analysis, 
control for the indirect effect. 
3.3.1 The Direct Effect of Transparency on Environmental Performance 
The direct effect of transparency on environmental performance is twofold. The first one 
connects to Gupta & Masons (2014) argument that global environmental governance uses 
transparency as a way of governing by disclosure. The same line of reasoning is presented 
by Florini (2010) who argues that nations use targeted disclosure as a way of governing, and 
thereby enhancing environmental performance. Targeted disclosure implies “regulation by 
revelation” (p. 123) and the idea behind it is instead of pushing regulation targets to 
accomplish certain standards, regulators require those targets to deliver information on 
what standards they are actually reaching. By then publishing that same information 
regulators hope to make those targets perform in a more socially desirable way. Examples of 
this type of targeted disclosure are Pollution Release and Transfer Registries which are 
active in most member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
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Development (OECD) (Florini, 2010, p. 124). This theory is sometimes referred to as the 
“sunshine is the best disinfectant” theory and simply implies that people will behave if there 
is a risk of exposure. Targeted disclosure is a measure that impacts both government 
transparency and private sector transparency. Governments legislate on access to 
information and then use this type of legislation to demand information from the private 
sector in order to publish it to citizens. One example of targeted disclosure can be seen in 
China where the government in 2008 adopted the country´s first Open Government 
Information Regulations (OGI). These new regulations aimed at increasing government 
transparency in China and it mandates all government agencies to create their own 
implementing measures. The Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) was the first to 
do so. The MEP is now obliged to grant access to environmental information such as laws 
and regulations, statistics and information on polluters. The MEP has consequently used 
these new regulations to govern by disclosure, through the publication of pollution levels in 
order to push companies and municipalities to act in a more environmentally beneficial way 
(Kaiser & Rongkun, 2009; Tan, 2014).    
The second direct link in which transparency affects environmental performance is by 
increasing accountability for mismanagement of the environment through principal-agent 
framework. Accountability is achieved through release of information that decreases the 
information asymmetry between the principals (citizens) and the agents (public officials). 
The theory argues that if principals have access to information about environmental abuse 
they will demand improvement and therefore, as long as information on environmental harm 
is obtainable, principals will ensure a stop to the mismanagement and hence environmental 
performance will be strengthened. In order for the principals to obtain information a 
transparent government is required (Florini, 2002).   
Both direct theoretical links between transparency and environmental performance are 
based on participation and accountability. In a substantial part of the literature these factors 
have been taken for granted as obvious effects of transparency (Gupta & Mason, 2014). Some 
scholars, on the other hand, argue that transparency needs to be accompanied by enabling 
factors that permit transparency to have desired effects. The next section will therefore 
elaborate on three factors that potentially could empower transparency.  
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3.3.1.1 Civil Society Engagement and Environmental 
Governance 
The first enabling factor is an engaged civil society (Ölund Wingquist et al., 2012). As 
discussed in section 3.2, principal-agent theory is the most commonly used explanation for 
the pathway in which transparency operates. Civil society, defined as; individuals and 
organizations in a society which are independent of the government and whose primary aim 
is not profit making (Peterson & Van, 2004), therefore has a vital role to play as principals 
that will, through access to information, be able to hold government officials (agents) 
responsible for mismanagement of public resources (Florini, 2002). According to Ölund 
Wingquist et al. (2012), the watchdog function of civil society is especially important in 
environmental governance due to its multi-stakeholder nature. Duit et al. (2015) argue that 
research on the environmental state opens a discussion on citizenship and the obligations 
and entitlements that follow from the environmental state. Citizens are for example entitled 
to environmental information (Duit et al., 2015) but this entitlement is followed by an 
obligation to hold public officials accountable for misconduct. Civil society will therefore 
enable positive effects from transparency on environmental performance by functioning as 
recipients of information regarding environmental performance and using that information 
to demand best practice.  
The question that returns throughout this research is whether the fact that the information 
is available is a guarantee for its usage. I will therefore investigate whether an engaged civil 
society is needed to enable the positive effects of transparency. I will return to this in section 
6.1: Operationalization of Variables.  
3.3.1.2 Education and Environmental Performance  
The level of education in a country has the potential to affect environmental performance 
through different pathways and will therefore function as the second enabling factor. 
Connecting to civil society and the ability of citizens to act as principals, education will 
improve citizen’s ability to interpret the information that is received (Gallego-Álvarez, 
Vicente-Galindo, Galindo-Villardon, & Rodriguez-Rosa, 2014). It is also more likely that 
environmental programmes will be initiated by an educated population and if environmental 
problems due rise, it is probable that an educated population will better possess the means to 
handle them (Gallego-Álvarez et al., 2014). Since citizens have an important function as a 
watchdog with regards to environmental performance (Ölund Wingquist et al., 2012) it is 
vital that the information that can be obtained is also understood. Education subsequently 
14 
 
have the ability to foster an understanding of how transparency works and what rights 
citizens possess to request information from public institutions. A higher level of education 
in the population might therefore enable transparency to have desired effects on 
environmental performance through the understanding of the right to information and the 
interpretability of that same information.   
3.3.1.3 Openness to trade and Environmental Performance   
A third possible enabling factor is openness to trade. Theories on the impact of trade 
openness on environmental performance suggests that it can be both positive and negative. 
Positive effects from trade openness could be cleaner production and, when trade expands, 
access to better technologies and environmental best practice. Negative effects from trade 
could be increased pollution and natural resource depletion due to increased production and 
consumption. Whether trade benefits or harms the environment depends on what kind of 
market openness to trade leads to, a high-tech service based economy or one based on 
extraction (Emerson, Esty, Srebotnjak & Connett, n.d.). Connecting trade openness to 
transparency, there is a possibility that openness to trade increases the number of Multi-
National Corporations (MNCs) in a country or with interests in a country, which then 
creates a new group of potential principals able to generate accountability. MNCs have the 
possibility to use information made available by governments to demand improved 
environmental performance of suppliers (Tan, 2014). Openness to trade might therefore 
enable transparency to have desired effects on environmental performance through the 
inclusion of a new group of principals, something that will be explored further in the next 
chapter.  
3.3.2 The Indirect Effect of Transparency on Environmental Performance  
The theory behind the indirect effect of transparency on environmental performance argues 
that transparency decreases corruption by enabling detection of bad practice, and in societies 
with low levels of corruption environmental performance tend to be better. The connection 
between corruption and environmental performance is by now well established (Pellegrini, 
2011; Peh & Drori, 2010; Lisciandra & Migliardo, 2016; Sundström, 2016). Corruption 
weakens environmental performance by, amongst other things, undermining environmental 
governance and delaying more stringent environmental laws (Lisciandra & Milgiardo, 
2016). It also creates opportunities for profiting on environmental degradation (bribes to 
forest guards) (Peh & Drori, 2010), it undermines environmental legislation and obstructs 
implementation when resource users bribe corrupt inspectors (Sundström, 2016). The 
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environmental realm is especially sensitive to corruption due to the fact that environmental 
goods are public goods and therefore need to be regulated through state intervention. A 
common anti-corruption measure is to decrease state intervention but since this is not 
desirable in environmental regulation, other anti-corruption measures are needed 
(Pellegrini, 2011). Transparency thus becomes a vital anti-corruption measure to prevent 
environmental harm (Peh & Drori, 2010).   
4. Review of the Evidence  
This section will delve into a review of the evidence connecting transparency to 
environmental performance. The review will be divided into two sections where the first 
subsection considers the evidence supporting the direct connection between transparency 
and environmental performance. The second subsection discusses the evidence supporting 
the role of transparency in enhancing environmental performance through combating 
corruption. 
4.1 The Direct Effect of Transparency on Environmental Performance  
As mentioned, there is a deficiency in research on the direct effect of transparency on 
environmental performance. Transparency is mostly promoted due to the theoretical 
promise of increased accountability and sunshine as the best disinfectant. This section will 
discuss two case studies conducted in China that employed the theoretical framework of 
principal-agent theory and targeted disclosure.  
When investigating transparency and environment, China has been used as a case study by 
two different scholars. One of them, Yeling Tan (2014), examined the effects of transparency 
under authoritarian settings through an investigation of China’s transparency measures. In 
2008, the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) adopted China’s Open 
Environmental Initiatives, as a response to the Open Government Information Regulations, 
which are examples of de jure transparency. Tan (2014) tried to distinguish whether these 
de jure measures of transparency resulted in de facto transparency and enhanced 
governance. He also examined whether the information was used by civil society to enhance 
environmental performance. Tan’s (2014) research therefore touched on the effects of 
transparency on environmental performance through principal-agent framework. 
Kaiser & Rongkun (2009) also investigated China and the Open Government Information 
Regulations to examine if the legislated transparency measures had an impact on de facto 
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transparency. This was done through investigating whether both governments and 
businesses disclosed information relevant for assessing environmental performance.    
The results of the two case studies were similar. With regards to de jure and de facto 
transparency both articles discussed the discrepancy existing between the two. According to 
Tan (2014) the level of de facto transparency with regards to environmental information 
depends on the goals of the different municipalities. If they are pro-environment they are 
also more prone to distribute information on environmental performances, but if they are 
more inclined to prioritize economic growth they are less motivated to distribute 
information. According to Kaiser and Rongkun (2009) consistent implementation of the 
different parts of the Open Government Information Regulations is lacking, one example 
being the production of disclosure reports annually by the different government agencies. 
The only agency to do so is the MEP. The authors also found a gap between the amount of 
requested information from citizens and the amount of information disclosed, strengthening 
discrepancy claims between de jure and de facto transparency.  
Turning to the ability of citizens and NGOs to use information to improve outcomes, both 
articles reported some positive results. Tan (2014) found that NGOs, through disclosure 
initiatives, were able to engage Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) in monitoring their 
suppliers and in some cases demand improved environmental efforts. Tan (2014) argued that 
non-state actor participation and influence worked through unusual pathways with the 
inclusion of multiple actors to strengthen the environment. For example, one NGO created a 
database using publicly available information disclosed by government agencies to rate 
companies on water pollution. This initiative displays the importance of civil society as a 
watchdog (Kaiser & Rongkun, 2009). The research conducted by Tan (2014) demonstrated 
that the effect of transparency on environmental performance might be enhanced through 
the involvement of civil society and trade openness, making these two enabling factors 
interesting to research further. The research made by Kaiser & Rongkun (2009) stated that 
NGOs were using transparency regulations to obtain information in order to pressure local 
factories and foster environmental activism. Also in this article, non-state actors seemed to 
have an ability to enhance the effect of transparency on environmental governance by 
demanding information and using it to hold wrongdoers responsible for their actions.  
Despite investigating the effects of transparency and whether civil society were able to use 
information provided to monitor and demand change, these two articles did not shed light 
on the actual substantive effects on environmental performance. Tan (2014) mentioned that 
NGO initiatives alongside pressure from MNCs have managed to persuade one local factory 
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to decrease emission levels. Noteworthy is that it was not until the MNC got involved that 
the factory agreed to oversee its production in order to reduce pollution (Tan, 2014). 
Looking at the review of the evidence supports the claim that transparency might not be 
effective in itself, but needs to be accompanied by enabling factors such as civil society 
engagement and openness to trade. It is also striking that no research displaying actual 
substantive effects on environmental performance between countries is obtainable, despite 
the promotion of transparency as an environmental performance enhancer, which leaves this 
dissertation with an important gap to fill.  
4.2 The Indirect Effect of Transparency on Environmental Performance  
Previous research on the indirect effect of transparency on environmental performance 
brings back the definitional problems connected to the concept of transparency. The 
economists George Halkos & Nickolaos Tzeremes (2014), argue that there is indeed a 
statistically significant relationship between public sector transparency and environmental 
performance when they tested this relationship on 49 countries. The authors investigated 
transparency by simply describing and operationalizing it as “the inverse of corruption”. 
According to the authors the negative effects of corruption on environmental performance 
were both direct and indirect. Direct since corruption weakens institutional quality and 
environmental policy implementation and indirect through the negative effect corruption 
has on income which in turn negatively affects environmental performance. Since the Halkos 
and Tzeremes (2014) study measured public sector transparency with an inverted 
measurement of Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index the results 
should be treated cautiously and, according to the theoretical discussion on conceptualizing 
transparency, not as an established relationship. Despite this, the study presents a clear case 
of the negative effects of corruption on environmental performance and an insight in how 
transparency might be beneficial in addressing the problem. 
Kelvin Peh & Ofir Drori (2010) investigated the levels of corruption in relation to 
environmental performance in 66 tropical developing countries, along with a case study on 
the situation in Cameroon. They found that where corruption levels were high, 
environmental performance was low, even amongst developing countries where GDP levels 
did not differ as much as between developing and developed countries. The case study of 
Cameroon showed that poor governance, corruption and a lack of social capital created a 
situation where environmental performance was extremely weak. The authors concluded 
that the only way to decrease corruption levels and, by extension, strengthen environmental 
performance was by increasing public sector transparency. They claimed that transparency 
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is key to good governance but also important for attracting funds and aid from international 
donors. If successful environmental projects are visible they will generate trust from the 
international community in investing further in the protection of the environment in 
Cameroon (Peh & Drori, 2010). Their arguments on how to improve the situation using 
transparency are based on theoretical expectations rather than empirics, once again pointing 
to the need of investigating this topic further.   
5. Aim and Research Questions 
Transparency has gained a strong position with regard to environmental performance and is 
promoted as a vital component in good governance and management of public goods. The 
impact of transparency on environmental performance is frequently discussed through 
theories on its effectiveness but without much empirical support. This is problematic since 
transparency in itself might not be enough to achieve enhanced environmental performance 
and hence, efforts to increase transparency might be futile and insufficient. This is especially 
pressing considering the discrepancy between de jure and de facto transparency. If 
transparency is vital for good governance and enhanced environmental performance it is 
important to investigate if these ambitious goals are reached with the existence and strength 
of transparency de jure or if it is the de facto levels of transparency that has the greatest 
effect on the environment. It is therefore the aim of this essay to investigate whether 
transparency (de jure and de facto) has an independent effect on environmental performance 
or if, in fact, enabling conditions are needed. It is also my intention to investigate the 
possibility of an indirect effect where transparency affects the environment through 
decreasing corruption. The research questions guiding this essay are therefore;  
 What effect does transparency have on environmental performance? 
 Is the effect of transparency on environmental performance running through corruption? 
 Is the effect of transparency on environmental performance dependent on an active civil 
society?  
 Is the effect of transparency on environmental performance dependent on the level of education 
in the population?  
 Is the effect of transparency on environmental performance dependent on trade openness?  
Based on the deliberation in the theoretical framework and the previous research regarding 
transparency and potential ways enabling factors would affect the results, the following 
hypotheses have been constructed:  
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H1a: The existence and strength of de jure transparency i.e. access to information laws will 
have a visible positive effect on countries environmental performance.  
H1b: The higher the level of de facto transparency, the stronger the environmental 
performance. 
H2: The positive effect of transparency on environmental performance will decrease under 
control for corruption.  
H3: The positive effect of transparency on environmental performance will increase with the 
presence of an active civil society. 
H4: The positive effect of transparency on environmental performance will increase with 
higher levels of education in the population.  
H5: The positive effect of transparency on environmental performance will increase with 
higher degrees of openness to trade.  
6. Data and Method 
To investigate country differences in de jure and de facto transparency, and whether 
environmental performance can be seen to be affected by these differences I conducted a 
large-N cross-country analysis using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. OLS allows 
you to predict values on the Y-axis based on the values on the X-axis by fitting a straight 
line (Field, 2009). It therefore enables the detection of patterns and relationships in the data. 
Since the aim also was to investigate whether the effect of transparency is dependent on or 
can be enhanced by enabling factors, I included interactions in the regressions.  
I started by performing bivariate and multivariate OLS regressions to establish whether 
there is an independent effect of transparency on environmental performance. I also included 
Control of Corruption as an intervening variable to investigate if there is a possibility that 
the effect of transparency on environmental performance is running through corruption. In 
the multivariate regressions, I applied forced entry of the control variables, meaning that 
there was no hierarchical order in the inclusion of controls. This is a good method for theory 
testing since the model gives replicable results. If variables are entered in a stepwise method 
there is a risk of random variation in the data influencing the results (Field, 2009).  
I performed interaction regressions in order to account for possible enabling factors for the 
effect of transparency on environmental performance. An interaction, or moderator, implies 
that the effect size of one variable is dependent on another variable (Field, 2009). In my case 
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I argue that the effect size of transparency on environmental performance is dependent on 
the activity of civil society, the level of education in the population and the degree of 
openness to trade. The formula for calculating an interaction effect will be presented in 
section 7.1.1, where I deliberate on the results. 
6.1 Data and Operationalization of Variables  
The chapter will proceed with an overview of the operationalization’s of the variables. The 
section will begin with a discussion concerning the dependent variables where strengths and 
weaknesses are elaborated. Thereafter, a discussion regarding the independent variables is 
presented where the difficulties of measuring transparency are considered. Subsequently 
follows a discussion on the three variables utilized for the interaction terms, and the chapter 
is then concluded with a discussion regarding the four control variables.  
6.1.1 Dependent Variables 
In order to investigate the effect of transparency on environmental performance, a variable 
that display national differences in environmental performance is needed. I decided to utilize 
two different variables in order to account for weaknesses in each of the measures. The first 
dependent variable is the Environmental Performance Index (EPI) created by Yale 
University. The index is a composite of 20 indicators of environmental performance divided 
into two issue areas; environmental health and ecosystem vitality (each accounting for 50 
percent of the final score). The index ranges from 0–100 where 100 is the best possible 
environmental performance. The data is collected and aggregated from different institutions 
such as the UN and national accounts that cover national environmental data 
(Environmental Performance Index, 2017). I used data from 2014 presented in the QoG 
Standard Dataset (Teorell, Dahlberg, Holmberg, Rothstein, Khomenko & Svensson, 2017). 
Since the creation of the index in 2006 it has evolved regarding the inclusion of indicators 
and the methodology applied in aggregating the results. The index has been used 
extensively by scholars for investigating, amongst other things, the effect of corruption on 
environmental performance (Lisciandra & Migliardo, 2014), country differences in 
environmental performance (Gallego-Álvarez et al., 2014) and the relationship between 
economic growth and environmental performance (Chang & Hao, 2017).   
The attraction of composite indexes such as the EPI is to enable more informed public 
decision-making and international organizations such as UN, the OECD and the EU are 
increasingly requesting these types of indexes (Rogge, 2012). However, the index has been 
exposed to criticism from different researchers arguing that the aggregation of the 
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indicators produces misleading results. Some of the indicators for which observations are 
lacking rely on imputation (Athanasoglou, Weziak-Bialowolska & Saisana, 2014). To 
address these problems, I relied on an evaluation report on the environmental performance 
index from 2014, conducted by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) (Athanasoglou et al., 2014). 
The EPI methodology changes between the publications of the data and I therefore chose to 
use data from 2014 since that data have been evaluated by JRC, which is not the case with 
the data from 2016. The evaluation deliberates on the weaknesses of the index with regards 
to aggregation and weight of the indicators. Despite weaknesses this index is the only index 
giving a comprehensive score on overall environmental performance for a large sample of 
countries, which is what this essay attempts to investigate. The weaknesses and the issue of 
noise in this variable nevertheless led me to include a second dependent variable.    
The second dependent variable is a measure of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. CO2 
emissions influence environmental performance since it is the largest contributor to global 
warming and make up the principal part of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere (World 
Bank, 2017b). CO2 emissions can therefore be said to be an indicator of environmental 
performance more generally (Povitkina, 2015). This variable is a thinner indicator that does 
not fully cover the concept “environmental performance” but it is with less noise than the 
full EPI variable. It measures one aspect of environmental performance and is therefore 
more accurate and reliable than the EPI which measures the full phenomenon but with 
greater inaccuracy. The measure of CO2 emissions utilized in this essay is an index created 
by taking the average CO2 emissions of countries over 5 years (2009–2013). The average 
measure was created since yearly country estimates have larger error bounds than trends 
(World Bank, 2017b). The data was collected from the World Bank data on CO2 emissions1 
(World Bank, 2017b), and is measured in metric tons per capita. Anthropogenic CO2 
emissions are generated mostly from fossil fuel combustion and cement manufacturing and 
the variable hence measure gases from the burning of fossil fuels and cement manufacturing 
but excludes emissions that originates from land use, such as deforestation (World Bank, 
2017b). For this analysis, the CO2 average index created was log transformed to account for 
positive skewness.  
6.1.2 Independent Variables 
This research paper employed two independent variables measuring de jure and de facto 
transparency. De jure transparency is, as discussed, the legislated measures of transparency 
                                                          
1 Original source: Carbon Dioxide Analysis Centre, Tennessee, United States 
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such as Access to Information (ATI) laws. Examples of these kind of laws are the Freedom 
of Information Act in the United States, or the Indian Right to Know law in India (Florini, 
2010). De facto transparency is the actual level of transparency in a country. 
The first independent variable measures de jure transparency and displays the strength of 
ATI laws in a country. The data (hereon referred to as the ATI index) is from 2011 and was 
retrieved from the Global Right to Information Rating (n.d), a programme funded by Access 
Info Europe (AIE) and the Centre for Law and Democracy (CLD). The ATI index consists 
of 61 indicators divided into seven categories; Right of Access, Scope, Requesting 
Procedures, Exceptions and Refusals, Appeals, Sanctions and Protections, and Promotional 
Measures, and simply measures the strength of the legal framework and not whether the 
laws are in fact implemented. The index is created by the AIE and the CLD who developed 
the indicators with support from an Advisory Council of experts. The AIE and CLD then 
applied the index to countries, given them a score that was later revised by local legal 
experts. The comments stemming from these reviews were then incorporated into the 
scoring. The index covers 102 countries who are given scores on all 61 indicators with a 
maximum score of 150 (Global Right to Information Rating, n.d). This measurement does 
not bleed into other aspects of de facto transparency but is focused strictly on the legal 
aspect of ATI. Based on the theoretical frame of this thesis, this variable is expected to 
enable an investigation of the first research question; What effect does transparency have on 
environmental performance, and hypotheses 1a; The existence and strength of de jure transparency 
i.e. access to information laws, will have a visible positive effect on countries environmental 
performance.   
Measuring de facto transparency is not unproblematic and existing measures contain more 
or less noise. I therefore chose a relatively new and thin measure of transparency presented 
by the Quality of Government institute (QoG), which measures government probity through 
expert assessment of four questions relating to transparency:  
 q11_a) public sector employees risk severe negative consequences if they pass on 
information about abuses of public power to the media,  
 q11_b) government documents and records are open to public access,  
 q11_c) abuses of power within the public sector are likely to be exposed in the media 
and  
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 q11_d) citizens and media actors can track the flow of government revenues and 
expenditures (Dahlström, Teorell, Dahlberg, Hartmann, Lindberg & Nistotskaya, 
2015b, p. 15-16).  
This measure is narrower than other measurements of transparency and takes both the 
purpose of transparency as well as the intended principals into account. The purpose of 
transparency in this measurement is increased accountability to achieve government probity 
and the intended principals are; politicians & government agencies, voters, NGOs, firms and 
the public in off-election periods. The purpose of transparency is not a perfect match 
considering the purpose of transparency in this dissertation is environmental accountability. 
The measure of transparency presented here should therefore be considered as a proxy. A 
government with open records, publicly available documents, where abuses are likely to be 
exposed and where media and citizens can track flows of revenues and expenditures are not 
likely to refuse environmental information. Correspondingly, the fact that the purpose of 
transparency in this measurement is connected to accountability and the intended principals 
are civil society actors this measurement is a suitable proxy for my dissertation. Specifically 
considering the theoretical underpinnings connecting transparency and environmental 
performance through principal-agent theory. That is, transparency produces accountability 
(purpose) since citizens (principals) use available information to hold public officials 
responsible for mismanagement.   
The data from 2014 were retrieved from the QoG expert survey II, (Dahlström et al., 2015a) 
conducted by researchers at the QoG institute2. The data are gathered through questionnaires 
answered by selected public administration experts (who each select a country for which to 
respond) and it covers 159 countries. The questions are answered on a scale of 1–7 with 1 
representing: not at all, and 7 representing: to a very large extent. In q11_b, q11_c and q11_d 
7 meant higher degrees of transparency and 1 meant lower degrees of transparency but in 
q11_a the coding ran in the opposite direction. I therefore recoded q11_a to run in the same 
direction as the other questions. The QoG Transparency Index was thereafter created by 
taking a mean average of the answers to the four questions, resulting in an average measure 
of government transparency covering 110 countries. To increase validity of the results, 
countries with answers from less than 3 experts were excluded from the analysis.  
Recent years have seen an increase in efforts to measure de facto transparency. Hollyer, 
Rosendorff & Vreeland (2014) created an index measuring transparency by investigating the 
                                                          
2 The QoG Institute is a research institute based at the Department of Political Science at the University of 
Gothenburg 
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extent to which countries release indicators requested by the WB for the construction of the 
World Development Indictors. This measure is interesting since it is an objective measure 
not relying on expert assessment. Nevertheless, a measure of transparency based on the 
collection and publication of data inevitably tap into state capacity and government quality. 
The Hollyer et al. (2014) measurement also does not capture whether the government 
release information that enables citizens to detect abuse. Another measure of de facto 
transparency is the Information Transparency Index, created by Andrew Williams (2015). 
The index measures the quantity, quality and the information infrastructure of countries. 
This is done by, for example, looking at how much information is being released to 
international institutions such as the WB and the IMF (same as Hollyer et al., 2014), 
measuring whether the production of information is appropriate and finally measuring if the 
information has the potential to reach the public (amount of internet connections and radios) 
(Williams, 2015). The index is a composite measure with data from the WB, the UN, 
different governments and other bodies. It is an index constructed from various sources with 
diverse definitions of transparency, making it difficult to assess what type of transparency 
that is being measured. It also taps into other fields such as information infrastructure and 
the capacity of the state to collect and publish information (Williams, 2015). The potential of 
information to reach the public, through internet and radio connections, is not an aspect that 
is directly connected to government transparency. For example, the amount of internet 
connections tells us nothing about whether the government is open and permits citizens to 
access information, but it could be a factor affecting the efficiency of transparency.  
As discussed, the index chosen for measuring de facto transparency is relatively thin and I 
therefore performed a robustness test using the Information Transparency Index from 2010 
(Williams, 2014). This index ranges from 0–100 with 100 being the most transparent. If 
transparency, when measured with a noisy variable, displays an insignificant effect on 
environmental performance this strengthens the theory of transparency needing enabling 
factors to be efficient.  
Data on transparency that is more connected to the environment would have been preferred, 
for example how many countries that legislate on the publication of environmental impact 
assessments and further, how many that are disclosed. Measuring availability of 
environmental information would present a clearer picture of what effect this type of 
information has on environmental performance, however, to my knowledge it does not exist. 
I would nevertheless argue that since the theoretical direct link between transparency and 
environmental performance is mostly based on principal-agent framework and the sunshine 
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is the best disinfectant theory, I contend that a measure of de facto transparency relating to 
government probity is a fairly reasonable proxy. A government with open records, publicly 
available documents, where abuses are likely to be exposed and where media and citizens can 
track flows of revenues and expenditures is not likely to refuse environmental information. 
Further, in order to investigate whether transparency alone affects environmental 
performance and isolate the effect, there are strong reasons for choosing a thin index of 
transparency that does not bleed conceptually into other aspects such as government 
effectiveness. This variable is expected to generate an answer to question number one; What 
effect does transparency have on environmental performance? and hypothesis 1b: The higher the 
level of de facto transparency, the stronger the environmental performance.  
In order to investigate a possible indirect effect of transparency, control of corruption was 
included as a potentially intervening variable. I used the World Governance Indicator 
(WGI); Control of Corruption produced by the World Bank Group (2017c). It ranges from -
2.5–2.5 where high values indicate more control of corruption. The index measures 
perceptions of corruption and it is a composite measure made from surveys conducted by 
several different survey institutes. Over 30 individual data sources were used to produce this 
composite measure (World Bank Group, 2017c). The WGIs have received criticism from the 
research community for neither specifying what type of corruption it measures (petty or 
grand, administrative or political), nor the precise mix of corruption types existing in a 
country (Thomas, 2010). Nevertheless, it is a measure displaying an overall measure of 
corruption in a country and it covers perceptions of corruption in both the public and the 
private sector (Grimes, 2013). The data are retrieved from the QoG Standard Dataset 
(Teorell et al., 2017) and represents the 2013 scores. The variable is expected to generate an 
evaluation of hypothesis number 2: The positive effect of transparency on environmental 
performance will decrease under control for control of corruption. 
6.1.3 Interaction Terms  
Since, there might be other variables affecting the success of transparency, as has been 
displayed in previous research, I operationalized three interaction terms that potentially 
increase the effect of transparency on environmental performance. The first interaction term 
used is civil society engagement. I chose to use data from the World Values Survey3 (WVS) 
on percentage of population that are members in environmental organizations as a proxy for 
                                                          
3 The WVS is a global network of social scientists who conduct research on values and their effect on societal 
and political life. The data collected by the WVS have gained wide knowledge and are used by researchers all 
over the world (World Value Survey, n.d) 
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civil society engagement. As noted, the fact that the information is obtainable does not 
automatically mean that it will be utilized by citizens. An engaged citizenry that is dedicated 
to environmental issues, on the other hand, might be more prone to use the information 
provided to demand stronger environmental performance. The effect of transparency on 
environmental performance might therefore be dependent on, or increased by, an engaged 
civil society. In order to measure civil society engagement, I created an index from two 
waves of surveys (since one would have been too small of a sample) in the WVS data. The 
first wave used was “wave 5” and the data was collected between 2005–2009 (World Value 
Survey wave 5) and the second wave used was “wave 6” which was conducted between 
2010–2014 (World Value Survey wave 6). The data was collected through questionnaires 
distributed amongst a population sample (no less than 1000 people) in different countries. 
The question on which I developed the index was “For each organization, could you tell me 
whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of 
organization?: Environmental organization” (World Value Survey, 2005). Since this index is 
based on two waves there is a possible 9-year difference between some observations. I 
would, however, argue that it is unlikely that civil society participation changes significantly 
in this amount of time. The variable is measured as the percentage of population that is a 
member (inactive and active) of an environmental organization, however it was recoded into 
a dichotomous variable with 0 representing a strong/active civil society and 1 representing 
a weak/inactive civil society. A strong civil society ranges from 9–36 percentage of the 
population that are active in an environmental organisation. A weak civil society ranges 
from 0.3-8.9 percentage of the population. The distinction between strong and weak was 
made by dichotomizing the measure at the mean value and by doing this, 33 countries 
represent both categories. Splitting the two in a different way would have rendered one side 
too small, but since the countries represents a random sample (World Value Survey, n.d.) 
generalizations should still be possible. 
This variable will reduce the sample size since the data cover 80 countries and only 66 of 
those countries had values for the other variables. A larger sample could have been 
generated through the inclusion of one more wave but that would have made the difference 
in time between some of data points 15 years. The starting year would have been 1999 
(Wave 4), which is a time that saw a lot of countries transitioning towards democracy and 
consequently most probably changed civil society. This variable will be used to answer 
hypothesis number 3, which is: The positive effect of transparency on environmental performance 
will increase with the presence of an active civil society. 
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The second interaction term is education. To account for educational level I employed the 
index: Average Schooling Years for Males and Females (+25) from the QoG Standard 
Dataset (Teorell et al., 2017), originally found in the Barro-Lee Educational Attainment 
Dataset (2013). The Barro-Lee dataset provides data on educational attainment for 146 
countries between 1950–2010 for males and females and was created through a collection of 
material from UNESCO (amongst others). The data were collected through census 
observations that report the distribution of educational attainment (Barro-lee, n.d). I used 
the data from 2010. This variable was dichotomized and divided along the mean. 0 therefore 
represents a higher level of education (above 8 years) and 1 represents a lower level of 
education (below 8 years). This variable will be used in answering hypothesis number 4: The 
positive effect of transparency on environmental performance will increase with a higher level of 
education in the population.   
My third and final interaction term is openness to trade, and it is measured by the trade 
openness index from the QoG Standard Dataset (Teorell et al., 2017). The original data were 
retrieved from the World Bank Doing Business Data (The World Bank, 2017a). The data measures 
the degree of regulation with regards to countries external economic activity and is created 
by taking a mean of standardized data from two Doing Business Data sets. It includes 
“average number of documents required to export and import and time for exporting and 
importing”, and it ranges from 1–10 with 10 displaying the highest degree of trade openness 
(Teorell et al., 2017, p. 415). Openness to trade enables MNCs to get invested in countries 
and thereby function as potential principals by using access to information as a measure to 
demand better environmental performance by suppliers. The trade openness index does not 
display the number of MNCs present in a country but researchers claim that a higher degree 
of trade openness will attract more companies. “Multinational firms engaged in export-
oriented investments may prefer to invest in a more open economy since increased 
imperfections that accompany trade protection generally imply higher transaction costs 
associated with exporting” (Demirhan & Masca, 2008, p. 359). To enable a clearer 
interpretation of the interaction this variable was recoded into a dichotomous variable with 0 
representing a high degree of openness to trade and 1 representing a low degree of openness 
to trade. The variable was dichotomized along the mean value (6.9) which means that 
countries with values below 6.9 are coded 1, whilst countries that display values above 6.9 
are coded 0. The third interaction term enables an investigation of hypotheses number 5; 
The positive effect of transparency on environmental performance will increase with higher degrees of 
openness to trade.    
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6.1.4 Control Variables 
A set of control variables were utilized to ensure that the relationship between transparency 
and environmental performance is not spurious. The variables range from economic to 
institutional; electoral democracy, Gross Domestic Product per capita, gas exports and 
bureaucratic capacity. The rationales and theoretical underpinnings for the choice of 
variables will be presented in this section.  
The first control variable utilized is electoral democracy. Regarding research on 
environmental performance, effects of regime types have attracted scholarly attention and it 
is widely agreed that democracies tend to outperform autocracies (Fiorino, 2011; Ölund 
Wingquist et al., 2012). This is especially true with regards to pollution levels but is also 
detected in wilderness protection and land use, but with weaker evidence. The reason for the 
stronger environmental performance of democracies is due to citizens’ ability to demand 
(through voting) decreased pollution and reduced natural resource extraction but also the 
tendency of democracies to focus on long-term issues that affects future generations 
(Fiorino, 2011). I controlled for regime type through the index, Electoral Democracy. This 
index measures to what extent the ideal of electoral democracy is reached in its fullest sense. 
I used data from 2014 presented in the QoG Standard Dataset (Teorell et al., 2017), but the 
index is originally taken from the V-Dem database4. The electoral democracy index is made 
by aggregating and taking the average of the sum of the indices measuring “freedom of 
association (thick), suffrage, clean elections, elected executive (de jure) and freedom of 
expression; and, on the other, the ﬁve-way interaction between those indices” (Teorell et al., 
2017, p. 591). The variable is dichotomous and 0 implies that the ideal of electoral 
democracy is not met and 1 implies that the ideal of electoral democracy is met (V-Dem, 
2016b, p. 44).  
The second control variable is GDP per capita and according to research, economic wealth is 
positively correlated with stronger environmental performance. A higher level of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita will increase a country’s capacity to provide its citizens 
with better economic, social and environmental living conditions (Gallego-Álvarez et al., 
2014). A higher level of GDP often means that a country can offer its citizens education 
which is something that is also positively connected to environmental performance. Another 
                                                          
4 V-Dem is a social science data collection initiative that is run by the Department of Political Science at 
Gothenburg university and the Kellogg Institute at the university of Notre Dame, USA. The V-Dem dataset is 
made up by factual documents obtainable from governments and institutions but also by subjective 
assessments provided by country experts (V-Dem, 2016a) 
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factor of GDP influenced change is the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) theory. The 
EKC theory argues that pollution levels will increase alongside economic growth up until a 
certain level of income and when this point is passed pollution levels decrease with growth 
in GDP per capita. The suggested reason for this is market transformation towards 
developing the service sector and innovative technologies instead of production using crude 
materials (Gallego-Álvarez et al., 2014). The decline in pollution after a certain level of 
wealth might also imply that people value other things than material prosperity (Duit, 
2005). I controlled for this variable by calculating an average measure of GDP per capita 
spanning over three years, 2013–2015, to account for yearly fluctuations. Data was derived 
from the WB national accounts data (The World Bank Group, 2017d) and is measured in 
current US$. The variable was log transformed in order to account for a skewed distribution 
and a non-linear relationship with environmental performance.        
The third control variable is gas exports, which functions as a proxy for natural resource 
dependency. Countries that are dependent on natural resources often demonstrate high 
levels of corruption and poor environmental performance (Ölund Wingquist et al., 2012). 
The large revenues from natural resources are highly sensitive to elite capture which means 
that a lot of revenue disappears in corrupt transactions within governments and are not 
spent on public goods such as environmental protection (NRGI, 2015). In order to control 
for natural resource dependency, I used an index created by Michael Ross that measures net 
gas exports value in dollars at constant year 2000 prices. It is not a perfect measure of 
natural resource dependency but it functions as a proxy displaying whether there is a 
correlation between how much gas a country exports and its environmental performance. 
Gas is correspondingly a beneficial resource to discuss due to its long production time, scale 
and non-renewable nature, which indicates that the effects of gas extraction are notable 
(NRGI, 2015). The data was retrieved from the QoG Standard Dataset (Teorell et al., 2017) 
and the values are from 2011. Due to the high values displayed in this variable it was divided 
by one hundred million (100 000 000) to facilitate interpretation of the coefficients. 
The last control variable is measuring bureaucratic capacity. Bureaucratic capacity is 
theorized to be highly relevant for the efficient provision of public goods. If institutions are 
faulty the common good will potentially be surpassed by political leaders’ self-interest. Since 
the environment is a public good that, as discussed earlier, needs to be regulated by the state 
a capable bureaucracy will potentially affect environmental performance. High bureaucratic 
capacity implies that implementation of environmental regulations and monitoring of 
compliance will be more obtainable (Povitkina, 2015). Due to lack of data investigating 
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bureaucratic capacity without bleeding into other concepts such as rule of law, bureaucratic 
capacity was proxied by meritocratic recruitment. Meritocratic recruitment is a key 
component of an effective bureaucracy insulated from political pressure. If bureaucrats are 
hired based on merit and skills this will in turn create a capable effective bureaucracy 
(Dahlström, Lapuente & Teorell, 2012). I created an index from data on meritocratic 
recruitment from 2014, taken from the QoG expert survey II dataset (Dahlström et al., 
2015a). The index was created as a mean on answers to three questions;  
 2a) “When recruiting public sector employees, the skills and merits of the applicants 
decide who gets the job”,  
 2d)” Public sector employees are hired via a formal examination system” and  
 2e) “The practice of hiring, firing, promoting and paying public sector employees 
follows provisions of the law and other legal documents regulating these processes” 
(Dahlström et al., 2015, p.8-9).  
All questions range from 1–7 with 1 implying hardly ever and 7 implying almost always. 
Values closer to 7 therefore indicates more meritocratic recruitment and higher levels of 
bureaucratic capacity. Since bureaucratic capacity is measured by a proxy, the measurement 
does not cover the entire concept of bureaucratic capacity. It is therefore possible that 
bureaucratic capacity has a stronger influence on the variables than is displayed in my 
results.    
6.2 Power and Limitations of chosen Method 
By utilizing a large-N cross-country analysis there is a lot to be gained. Contrary to 
qualitative research the results are more objective and generalizable. A large-N design offers 
opportunities for identifying patterns and regularities within the data (Field, 2009). 
Furthermore, interactions offers a possibility to go beyond the variables themselves and 
investigate whether there is an extra effect by combining variables into interactions. As the 
goal of my thesis is to investigate whether a relationship exists between two or more 
variables this is a straight forward method that offers a clear picture of the relationship.  
There are, however, some limitations to the method. One of the main limitations for this 
research project was the lack of data, especially concerning civil society engagement in 
environmental matters. A greater sample would have rendered the results more reliable and 
robust. Another limitation with regards to OLS is the fact that if an assumption is violated it 
jeopardizes the generalizability of the results (Field, 2009).  
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Considering other potentially beneficial models for exploring the relationship between my 
variables, cross-sectional time-series analysis could have been a desirable choice. The OLS-
method simply provides a snapshot of a moment in time and, considering de jure 
transparency, it could have been interesting to investigate whether ATI laws that have been 
in place for a longer period of time has had a significant impact on environmental 
performance. Time-series analysis would have allowed for a track of changes in the variables 
over time and thus enabling a consideration regarding whether changes over time in 
environmental performance could in fact stem from ATI legislation. The reason for not 
applying this method was due to interactions not being a possibility in time-series analysis.  
7. Results and Analysis 
This section presents the results of the statistical analysis and conducts analyses of the 
generated results in parallel. In order to answer the first and main research question; what 
effect does transparency have on environmental performance, transparency was divided into de jure 
and de facto. The results chapter will consequently be divided between de jure and de facto, 
and the research questions and hypotheses will be answered with regards to both. Section 
7.1 presents the results concerning de jure transparency and addresses the interactions with 
ATI in section 7.1.1. De jure transparency and the second dependent variable, CO2 
emissions, are discussed in section 7.1.2. Thereafter, section 7.2 presents the results 
regarding de facto transparency and addresses the interactions with the QoG index in 
section 7.2.1. Subsequently section 7.2.2 demonstrates the results of the QoG index when 
the dependent variable is replaced by CO2 emissions. The chapter concludes with a section, 
7.3, discussing diagnostics.  
7.1 De jure Transparency 
De jure transparency is measured by the existence and strength of ATI laws which thus 
represents the first independent variable. Starting with a simple correlational test (appendix 
1) between the two variables, ATI and EPI, demonstrates that there is a weak negative 
insignificant correlation between ATI score and environmental performance. Table 1 model 
1 displays the same result as the correlational test, but in a bivariate regression between the 
ATI indicator and environmental performance. 
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Table 1 – The Effect of de jure Transparency on Environmental Performance 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Unstandardized coefficients. Standard errors within parenthesis. 
Interaction coding –Civil society engagement (0= Strong Civil Society, 1= Weak Civil Society), 
Education (0= high level of education, 1= low level of education), Trade openness (0= high degree of 
trade openness, 1= low degree of trade openness). 
Model 1 demonstrates that there seems to be a weak negative correlation between the two 
where a 1 unit increase in ATI score results in a .158 unit drop in environmental 
performance. In order to calculate the total effect of ATI on environmental performance, the 
top score of ATI, which is 150, was multiplied with the main effect of ATI from model 1. 
150×-.158 = -23.7, which indicates that countries with the strongest ATI laws tend on 
average to score 23.7 units lower on the EPI index than countries with the weakest ATI 
laws, under control for other relevant factors. Nevertheless, the significance, p = .054, of the 
results is rendered just outside the 95 percent confidence interval leading the results to be 
insignificant which indicates that they should be treated with caution, and not as an 
established relationship. 
DV: 
Environmental 
Performance 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
IV: ATI score -.158 (.081) -.064 (.051) .019 (.051) .002 (.135) .028 (.053) -.002 (.005) 
Trade Openness   -8.017* (3.751) -5.762 (4.036) -7.052 (3.996) -19.181 
(13.088) 
Electoral 
Democracy 
  .646 (4.363) -2.317 (5.047) .957 (4.411) -.174 (4.471) 
Log average GDP 
per capita 
  9.458*** 
(1.708) 
8..903*** 
(2.117) 
8.915*** 
(1.870) 
9.660*** 
(1.728) 
Average years of 
schooling for males 
and females (25+)  
  -3.494 (3.254) -6.277 (4.870) 6.651 (14.166) -4.308 (3.389) 
Meritocratic 
recruitment  
  -.518 (1.244) 1.058 (1.811) .161 (1.555) -.975 (1.349) 
Gas Exports   -.018 (.036) -.037 (.038) -.016 (.036) -021 (.036) 
Control of 
Corruption 
 11.946*** 
(.977) 
    
Engaged Civil 
Society 
   -2.506 (14.969)   
ATI × Civil Society    .064 (.157)   
ATI × Education     -.124 (.169)  
ATI × Trade 
Openness 
     .119 (.134) 
Constant 69.249*** 59.417*** -25.289 -25.579 -24.408 -22.781 
R2 .041 .647 .800 .847 .803 .805 
N 91 90 44 30 44 44 
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The r2 value in model 1, which is the amount of explained variance, is only .041, meaning 
that the ATI score explains approximately 4 percent of the change in the dependent 
variable. Approximately 96 percent of the change in the dependent variable is consequently 
explained by other variables. This result is somewhat surprising considering the promotion 
of de jure transparency as an enhancer of environmental performance. The reason for the 
weak relationship between de jure transparency and environmental performance supports 
the claims that a discrepancy exists between the existence and strength of ATI laws and 
their actual implementation. In order for citizens to access information there is, for example, 
a need for an effective bureaucracy that can manage and distribute the information, and the 
mere existence of ATI laws does not imply the existence of a capable bureaucracy.  
Table 2 – Pearson’s Correlation between de jure and de facto Transparency  
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. 
Table 2 presents a correlational test between the three variables measuring transparency 
and it displays that there is a weak to non-existing correlation between the de facto 
measures and the ATI indicator, suggesting that the ATI variable is measuring something 
different than transparency. This finding is important since international organisations, such 
as the WB and IMF, include transparency legislation as a potential conditionality for loans 
in an effort to increase citizen’s opportunities to access information and strengthen 
environmental performance. The EU is also, in an attempt to incorporate the Aarhus 
Convention into member state legislation, pushing for ATI laws. Since the Aarhus 
Convention is aimed at increasing citizens access to information and participation in decision 
making, and thereby strengthen environmental performance, these results are imperative 
and suggest that the strive to enhance transparency and environmental performance 
through ATI legislation might be futile.  
Returning to Table 1, model 3 displays the inclusion of control variables which made the 
significance of the ATI indicator drop even more, leaving only log GDP per capita and trade 
openness with significant impacts on environmental performance. The positive effect of log 
GDP per capita follow well in line with previous research arguing for the importance of this 
variable in explaining differences in environmental performance, through for example the 
  QoG Mean 
Transparency Index 
ATI score Information 
Transparency 
QoG Mean 
Transparency Index 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.005 .606** 
 N 110 79 109 
ATI score Pearson Correlation -.005 1 -.025 
 N 79 95 93 
Information 
Transparency 
Pearson Correlation .606** -.025 1 
 N 109 93 179 
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Environmental Kuznets Curve theory. The negative sign on the trade openness coefficient, b 
= -8.017, indicates that countries less open to trade perform worse on the EPI with scores, 
on average, 8 points lower. Since this variable was dichotomized, a one unit change in this 
variable means going from 0 (high degree) to 1 (low degree), indicating that with a 
movement from a high to a low degree of openness to trade environmental performance 
drops 8.017 units. Since previous research has debated whether openness to trade has 
positive or negative impacts on environmental performance, this result is as expected. The 
ATI indicator, gas exports, bureaucratic capacity and electoral democracy all demonstrated 
insignificant results, p >.05, meaning that these variables did not have an ability to predict 
changes in the outcome.   
Models 1 and 3 provide insights for the consideration of hypothesis 1a: The existence and 
strength of de jure transparency i.e. access to information laws will have a visible positive effect on 
countries environmental performance. According to the results in models 1 and 3 de jure 
transparency has no independent effect on environmental performance, which therefore 
means that hypothesis 1a is not accepted. The sample size in the multivariate regression in 
model 3 is quite small (44 countries) but the fact that the ATI indicator shows no effect on 
environmental performance even in the bivariate regression (model 1), with a sample of 91 
countries strengthens the conclusion that de jure transparency, has no independent effect on 
environmental performance and consequently supports the null hypothesis.  
Moving on to hypotheses 2: The positive effect of transparency on environmental performance will 
decrease under control for corruption. Model 2 in Table 1 displays a multivariate regression 
with the variable control of corruption. The control of corruption variable is meant to 
investigate the indirect effect of transparency on environmental performance. This is done 
by adding control of corruption to the regression to see whether it decreases the effect of 
transparency on environmental performance, but since transparency in this case has no 
significant effect to start with it is hard to evaluate whether corruption impacts this variable. 
The coefficient of the ATI indicator decreases slightly between models 1 and 2, from b = -
.158 to b = -.064, but the estimates are insignificant in both models, making the result 
highly unreliable. The coefficient of control of corruption is large (11.946) and the amount of 
explained variance increases greatly from r2 =.041 to r2= .647, which suggests that control 
of corruption has a relatively strong effect on environmental performance. Regarding de jure 
transparency, and the fact that its effect is insignificant, it is therefore not possible to accept 
hypotheses number 2.       
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7.1.1 De jure Transparency and Interactions 
An interaction can be calculated from the following formula; y=A+B+A×B, where A×B is 
the product of A and B. The regression coefficient of A displays the effect of A when B is 
zero and the coefficient of B shows the effect of B when A is zero. The coefficient of A×B 
further display how the effect of A changes with a one-unit increase in B (Field, 2009). 
The interaction models were included in the analysis to investigate whether transparency 
needs favourable conditions to have a greater effect on environmental performance. The 
variables forming the interaction terms are, an engaged civil society, level of education and 
openness to trade. They were all coded as dichotomous variables where 0 implies a 
strong/active civil society, a high level of education and a high degree of openness to trade 
and 1 implies a weak/inactive civil society, low levels of education and a low degree of 
openness to trade.  
The first interaction model (model 4) displays the effect of transparency with civil society on 
environmental performance. The civil society index contains 66 countries and adding it to 
an interaction term with transparency decreases the sample further and leaves 35 cases (30 
when control variables are added). The results of model 4 are insignificant, which implies 
that there is no extra effect on environmental performance when civil society is strong, but if 
they were significant, the results would indicate that when the civil society variable is 0 
(strong civil society) the effect of ATI is .002. This would indicate that with a strong civil 
society the effect of ATI laws on environmental performance is weakly positive. The 
coefficient of the interaction term, which presents the difference in the slope of ATI when 
civil society equals 0 and when it equals 1, is .064. Adding this coefficient to the main effect 
for ATI displays the slope of ATI when civil society equals 1, .064+.002 = .066. If these 
results were significant, which they are not, this would indicate that ATI has a small 
positive effect on environmental performance when civil society is strong and a somewhat 
larger positive effect when civil society is weak. However, the results are insignificant and 
this, together with the small sample size makes it difficult to draw accurate conclusions from 
the results.  
It was hypothesised that a civil society engaged in environmental organisations would 
increase the positive effect of transparency but instead it displays no effect. One potential 
explanation for this is that countries with great environmental problems attract more people 
to join environmental organisations. For example, environmental organisation membership 
constitutes 35.8 percent of the population in Indonesia (World Value Survey Wave 5), a 
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country that struggles with deforestation and emissions (Vidal, 2014, 29 June). The country 
with the second highest percentage of the population (28.7 percent) engaged in 
environmental organisations is the Philippines. The Philippines struggle with emissions in 
both water and air and are also subject to deforestation problems (Panela, 2014, 31 October). 
We might therefore be looking at a case of reversed causation where poor environmental 
performance causes people to join environmental organisations. Nevertheless, at this stage 
we cannot accept hypotheses number 3; The positive effect of transparency on environmental 
performance will increase with the presence of an active civil society.       
The second interaction term is level of education multiplied with ATI (model 5) and these 
results are also insignificant, which reveals that there is no extra effect on environmental 
performance when education levels are high. Still interpreting what they would suggest if 
they were significant, the coefficient of ATI, b = .028, implies that when the coefficient of 
education is 0 (high level of education) ATI has a small positive effect on environmental 
performance. The coefficient of the interaction term is -.124. To calculate the slope of ATI 
when education is 1 (lower level of education) the main effect of ATI was added to the 
interaction coefficient: .028+-.124= -.096. If the results were significant that would translate 
into ATI having a small positive effect on environmental performance at higher levels of 
education and a negative effect at lower levels of education. Due to the theoretical positive 
effect of education on environmental performance (Gallego-Álvarez et al., 2014) the 
hypothesis assumed that education would generate a more positive interaction with de jure 
transparency, but since the ATI variable was uncorrelated with de facto transparency these 
insignificant results might not be so surprising. If the ATI laws are not implemented 
properly it might not matter if the population is educated or not since information might 
still be unavailable. Since the results generated from this interaction model are insignificant, 
hypotheses number 4: The positive effect of transparency on environmental performance will 
increase with a higher level of education in the population, was not accepted. 
The third and last interaction term is openness to trade multiplied with ATI and it is 
displayed in model 6. The results are again insignificant, suggesting that there is no extra 
effect on environmental performance with a higher degree of openness to trade. If the results 
were significant however, the coefficient of the ATI score would suggest that when the trade 
openness variable is 0 (high degree of openness to trade) the effect of ATI laws on 
environmental performance would be -.002. The coefficient of the interaction term is .119 
and in order to investigate the slope of ATI when trade openness is 1 the coefficient of the 
interaction was added to the main effect of ATI, .119+-.002 = .117. If the results were 
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significant this outcome would indicate that ATI has a small negative effect on 
environmental performance at high degrees of openness to trade and a positive effect at low 
degrees of openness to trade. Since theory is undecided on whether trade has a positive or 
negative effect on environmental performance this would be a probable result. Higher 
degrees of openness to trade could generate more emissions and natural resource depletion 
due to increased production. Since ATI is uncorrelated with de facto transparency it is 
difficult to theorize why ATI would have a negative impact on the environment at high 
degrees of openness to trade, nevertheless, the interaction term is insignificant which means 
that the results are unreliable. Due to the insignificance of the results, hypotheses number 5: 
The positive effect of transparency on environmental performance will display a greater effect with 
openness to trade, was not accepted.  
7.1.2 De jure Transparency and Carbon Dioxide emissions 
As discussed in section 6.1, the EPI has some weaknesses and the variable contains a high 
degree of noise. In order to account for this and generate robust results I repeated the 
regressions above using a thinner measurement of environmental performance, namely CO2 
emissions, presented in table 3 on the following page. The results of the regressions with 
CO2 support the results generated with the environmental performance index. De jure 
transparency does not demonstrate an independent effect on environmental performance. 
The bivariate regression shows an extremely weak negative relationship, b = -.004, between 
the ATI index and CO2 emissions and the result is insignificant. The change of dependent 
variable can therefore not lead to an acceptance of hypothesis 1a. Regarding the indirect 
effect of transparency on environmental performance this second set of results (table 3) does 
not provide a more reliant answer to hypothesis number 2, again due to the lack of effect 
stemming from ATI legislation. Noteworthy is that the coefficient of control of corruption is 
positive and positive coefficients translate into more CO2 emissions. This means that a one 
unit increase in control of corruption increases the log of CO2 emissions by .448 units, all 
else equal. This result is significant and goes against theory claiming that higher degrees of 
control of corruption leads to improved environmental performance. A potential explanation 
for this result could be that countries with higher levels of control of corruption are 
developed countries and developed countries commonly generate more emission. 
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Table 3 – The Effect of de jure Transparency on Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Unstandardized coefficients. Standard errors within parenthesis. 
Interaction coding –Civil society engagement (0= Strong Civil Society, 1= Weak Civil Society), 
Education (0= high level of education, 1= low level of education) and Trade openness (0= high 
degree of trade openness, 1= low degree of trade openness). 
The only control variable, except for control of corruption, that exhibits an effect on CO2 
emissions is the gas exports variable, which is significant throughout all models. The 
negative sign on the coefficients (in all the models) suggests that gas exports have a 
negative impact on CO2 emissions. This result does not support theory that a high 
dependence on natural resources generates a negative impact on the environment.  
 
 
 
 
DV: 
Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions (metric 
tons) log 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
IV: ATI score -.004 (.011) .001 (.011) .013 (.011) -.006 (.024) .009 (.011) .009 (.011) 
Trade Openness   1.037 (.839) .858 (.802) .211 (.938) -2.001 (2.642) 
Electoral Democracy   .533 (998) 1.205 (1.028) .368 (.972) .176 (1.034) 
Log average GDP per 
capita 
  .192 (381) -.295 (.440) .576 (.429) .282 (.386) 
Average years of 
schooling for males 
and females (25+)  
  1.190 (.669) .406 (.927) -4.179 (3.113) .958 (.691) 
Meritocratic 
recruitment  
  .352 (.269) .475 (.361) -.108 (.369) .215 (.290) 
Gas Exports   -.023** (.008) -.016* (.007) -.025** (.008) -.022* (.008) 
Control of Corruption  .448* (.221)     
Engaged Civil Society    .448 (2.594)   
ATI × Civil Society    -.021 (.027)   
ATI × Education     .068 (.038)  
ATI × Trade 
Openness 
     .034 (.028) 
Constant 10.534*** 10.030*** 5.913 12.476* 4.921 6.411 
R2 .002 .050 .379 .640 .436 .407 
N 83 83 40 27 40 40 
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7.2 De facto Transparency  
De facto transparency is measured through the QoG Mean Transparency Index and, as 
stated earlier, countries with less than three expert responses have been excluded from the 
analysis. Starting with a simple scatter plot (figure 1), it is easy to assume that there exists a 
positive relationship between de facto transparency and environmental performance.  
Figure 1 – Relationship between QoG Transparency and Environmental Performance 
 
However, there is also a lot of variation not being explained by transparency. For any 
number on the x-axis there is a large variation among the observations on their scores on 
the y-axis, meaning that there are other factors influencing countries environmental 
performance besides transparency. In Table 4 model 1 the bivariate regression displays a 
positive and statistically significant, p < .001, relationship between de facto transparency 
and environmental performance, where a one unit increase in the independent variable 
results in an 8.452-unit increase in the dependent variable. Looking at the amount of 
explained variance, r2 = .278, demonstrates that 27.8 percent of the change in the dependent 
variable can be explained by the independent variable. 
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Table 4 – The Effect of de facto Transparency on Environmental Performance 
 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Unstandardized coefficients. Standard errors within parenthesis. 
Interaction coding –Civil society engagement (0= Strong Civil Society, 1= Weak Civil Society), 
Education (0= high level of education, 1= low level of education) and Trade openness (0= high 
degree of trade openness, 1= low degree of trade openness). 
The coefficient in model 1, b = 8.452, is large which indicates that it has a noteworthy 
impact on environmental performance. Calculating the total effect of the QoG index, (top 
score of QoG index multiplied by main effect in model 1) 7×8.452=59.164, demonstrates 
that countries with the highest level of de facto transparency tend on average to score 
59.164 units higher on environmental performance than countries with the lowest level of de 
facto transparency, all else equal. Nevertheless, the addition of control variables (model 3) 
renders the coefficient of the QoG index negative and it loses all significance. As with 
transparency de jure, only log GDP per capita has a significant impact on environmental 
performance. Model 1 and 3 assist in examining hypothesis 1b: The higher the level of de facto 
transparency, the stronger the environmental performance. Model 1 points to accepting 
hypotheses 1b but since the relationship does not hold with the inclusion of control variables 
hypotheses 1b is not accepted. According to the results in model 3, de facto transparency has 
no independent effect on environmental performance when controlling for other factors. 
DV: 
Environmental 
Performance 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
IV: QoG 
Transparency Index 
8.452*** 
(1.513) 
.230 (1.499) -1.496 (1.649) 2.603 (3.416) -1.158 (1.752) -1.143 (1.759) 
Trade Openness   -6.190 (3.116) -4.635 (3.665) -6.124 (3.141) .959 (12.119) 
Electoral 
Democracy 
  -.230 (3.211) -1.295 (4.311) -.048 (3.249) .124 (3.287) 
Log average GDP 
per capita 
  9.129*** 
(1.343) 
8.495*** 
(1.919) 
8.804*** 
(1.454) 
8.691*** 
(1.531) 
Average years of 
schooling for males 
and females (25+)  
  -1.543 (3.130) -1.811 (5.013) 5.313 (11.711) -1.777 (3.177) 
Meritocratic 
recruitment  
  .516 (1.321) .659 (2.130) .685 (1.360) 
 
.717 (1.371) 
Gas Exports   -.014 (.034) -.026 (.039) -.015 (.035) -.010 (.035) 
Control of 
Corruption 
 10.226*** 
(1.235) 
    
Engaged Civil 
Society 
   16.889 (14.862)   
QoG Transparency 
× Civil Society 
   -2.860 (3.347)   
QoG Transparency 
× Education 
    -2.039 (3.354)  
QoG Transparency 
× Trade Openness 
     -2.085 (3.414) 
Constant 25.091*** 55.580*** -18.443 -33.461 -17.706 -16.924 
R2 .278 .613 .773 .800 .775 .775 
N 83 82 50 34 50 50 
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Considering the promotion of transparency, the results generated are surprising and 
suggests that the theoretical promise of transparency does not translate into actual 
substantial effects.  
Moving on to hypotheses 2: The positive effect of transparency on environmental performance will 
decrease under control for corruption. Model 2 lends some support for this hypothesis. 
Transparency is significantly affecting environmental performance in model 1 until the 
inclusion of control of corruption in model 2, where the entire effect of transparency 
disappears. This result suggests that the effect of transparency on environmental 
performance might be running through corruption and therefore indirectly affects 
environmental performance. That is, the relationship existing between transparency and 
environmental performance in model 1 might depend on the fact that transparency decreases 
corruption and decreased corruption enhances environmental performance. This follows in 
line with previous research claiming that transparency increases detection of malpractice 
and therefore decreases corruption, which in extension leads to improved environmental 
outcomes, but since the effect of transparency disappears when controls are added the 
relationship cannot be investigated further. I will return to this question in the robustness 
test with information transparency.  
7.2.1 De facto Transparency and Interactions 
The interaction terms in table 4 are created the same way as the interactions with de jure 
transparency, namely by multiplying the QoG index with each one of the enabling variables. 
The results generated from the interactions, models 4–6, with the QoG index follow the 
same pattern of insignificance as the interactions created from de jure transparency. The 
results in section 7.1 pointed to ATI not being correlated to de facto transparency, which 
means that ATI is in fact measuring something quite different from transparency. The QoG 
index on the other hand measures the actual existence of transparency in countries and the 
fact that none of the interaction terms containing the QoG index displayed significant 
results further questions the promotion of transparency as an enhancer of environmental 
performance. The hypotheses concerning the interactions assumed increased effects of 
transparency on environmental performance from a strong civil society, a higher level of 
education and a higher degree of openness to trade due to the strengthening of principals 
able to demand best practise. The insignificance of the results implies that none of the 
hypotheses concerning interactions can be accepted. The result is surprising considering the 
theoretical links between the enabling factors, transparency and the environment. There is a 
possibility that a de facto measurement more connected to environmental information could 
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have generated a different result but the evidence now point to transparency demonstrating 
no effect despite enabling factors.  
Nevertheless, a final important aspect to take into consideration regarding all the 
interactions with the QoG index is that the exclusion of log GDP per capita as a control 
variable renders all the interaction terms significant (see appendix 2). GDP per capita 
measures how evolved a society is in general which makes the fine mechanisms harder to 
detect and also generates correlations with other variables. The QoG index still exhibit an 
insignificant effect on environmental performance, even with the exclusion of log GDP per 
capita, which supports the conclusion that de facto transparency does not have an 
independent effect on environmental performance. The fact that the interactions become 
significant with the exclusion of GDP is however highly interesting, and suggests that there 
is a possibility that de facto transparency could influence environmental performance but 
only when combined with other factors. Regarding civil society, transparency has a positive 
effect (b =6.595) on environmental performance when civil society is strong and a negative 
effect (b =-2.026) when civil society is weak. The interaction containing levels of education 
shows that transparency has a negative effect on the environment at both higher and lower 
degrees of education. The interaction containing openness to trade displays that with a high 
degree of openness to trade transparency has a small positive effect (b =.083) on 
environmental performance and with a low degree of openness to trade it has a negative 
effect (b =-11.081) on environmental performance.  
7.2.2 De facto Transparency and Carbon Dioxide Emissions  
The same procedure as in the de jure section was applied to the de facto section, namely 
replacing the environmental performance index with CO2 emissions. The results are 
displayed in table 5, on the following page.  
The findings in this table generate support for the results found in table 4, namely that 
transparency has no independent effect on environmental performance when other factors 
are controlled for. In fact, the only variable displaying a significant result is the gas export 
variable. None of the interaction effects are significant and will therefore not be interpreted 
further at this point. As in table 3 model 2, control of corruption again displays a positive 
correlation with CO2 emissions at a 95 percent confidence level, which means that with a one 
unit increase in control of corruption the log of CO2 emissions increase with .522 units.  
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 Table 5 – The Effect of de facto Transparency on Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Unstandardized coefficients. Standard errors within parenthesis. 
Interaction coding –Civil society engagement (0= Strong Civil Society, 1= Weak Civil Society), 
Education (0= high level of education, 1= low level of education) and Trade openness (0= high 
degree of trade openness, 1= low degree of trade openness). 
7.2.3 Robustness Test with Information Transparency 
I also performed a robustness test using a broader measure of transparency, namely the 
Andrew Williams information transparency index. The robustness test was made both for 
the environmental performance index and for CO2 emissions. The results from the 
robustness test strengthens the findings in both de jure and de facto transparency. Namely 
that there is no independent effect of transparency on environmental performance. Using the 
information transparency index also brings in factors such as information infrastructure and 
thus, according to the conceptualisation used in this essay, covers more than just 
transparency. The fact that there is no independent effect even with a wider measurement 
DV: 
Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions (metric tons) 
log 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
IV: QoG index -.112 (.244) -.537 (.318) -.198 (.354) -1.071* (.496) -.241 (.384) -.112 (.389) 
Trade Openness   1.205 (.738) 1.227* (.563) 1.195 (.748) 2.905 (3.064) 
Electoral Democracy   .751 (766) .163 (640) .686 (.804) .894 (.813) 
Log average GDP per 
capita 
  .285 (.313) .033 (.302) .339 (.360) .184 (.361) 
Average years of 
schooling for males and 
females (25+)  
  .604 (.719) -.142 (.827) -.230 (2.747) .604 (.726) 
Meritocratic 
recruitment  
  .224 (.310) .860* (.362) .191 (.331) .260 (.319) 
Gas Exports   -.020* (.009) -.016* (.006) -.019* (.009) -.021* (.009) 
Control of Corruption  .522* (.259)     
Engaged Civil Society    -3.656 (2.075)   
QoG × Civil Society    .522 (.465)   
QoG × Education     .245 (.776)  
QoG × Trade 
Openness 
     -.499 (.873) 
Constant 11.301*** 12.859*** 7.505* 12.779*** 7.382* 7.806* 
R2 .003 .058 .248 .649 .250 .255 
N 73 73 43 30 43 43 
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strengthens the results of my research. The interaction effects were also insignificant and 
will therefore not be interpreted further at this point (see appendix 3 and 4 for full tables). 
Model 2 (appendix 3) provides some support for hypothesis 2: The positive effect of 
transparency on environmental performance will decrease under control for corruption. The effect 
size of transparency decreases with the inclusion of control of corruption from .899 to .509, 
p<.001. The fact that the effect size decreases implies that some of the effect of transparency 
runs through corruption. Transparency could hence, in line with the theory of the indirect 
effect, be an indirect cause for the variation in environmental performance. An intervening 
variable is a variable that follows the independent variable but precedes the dependent 
variable. Since there is a strong theoretical link between transparency and corruption and 
corruption and environmental performance it is likely that corruption could be an 
intervening variable, but since the effect of transparency does not hold with the addition of 
control variables the relationship cannot be investigated further.  
7.3 Diagnostics  
Since the method employed is an OLS regression containing interactions I have explored 
whether the assumptions connected to OLS where met. The figures and tables can be found 
in the appendix. The diagnostics for the robustness test will not be discussed but is available 
in appendix 12 and 13. 
The assumptions of OLS are; linearity, normal distribution, homoscedasticity, independence 
of errors, no multicollinearity and no outliers (Field, 2009). Since some of my variables are 
categorical the linearity assumption cannot be checked for all of them. I will begin with the 
diagnostics for de jure transparency (ATI) with environmental performance and go through 
the steps taken in detail. I will thereafter go through all tables from the results section and 
their diagnostics but I will only discuss and present graphs and tables that were of concern. 
Beginning with de jure transparency and the environmental performance index initial checks 
such as linearity (in available variables) and distributions where made and, as discussed in 
the operationalization section some of the variables where log transformed to account for 
skewness.  
Homoscedasticity means that the residuals have a constant variation from the mean (Field, 
2009) and it was controlled for by producing a residual plot, see appendix 5. The figure 
shows some signs of heteroscedasticity which does not create bias but might cause the p-
values to be unreliable. The recommendation by Field (2009) is to change the confidence 
interval to p<.01 instead of p<.05. The only variable displaying significance across the 
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models in table 1 was log GDP per capita at p<.001 which means that the significance was 
already stronger than suggested by Field (2009). The same goes for corruption in model 2 
and the only other variable that displayed a significant result at a threshold higher than 
p<.01 was trade openness in model 3, which does not influence the interpretation of the 
results. If an assumption, such as homoscedasticity, is violated it is harder to generalize the 
results beyond the sample (Field, 2009, p. 251). For table 1 this assumption has been 
violated but since the p-values are strong enough it does not seriously affect my results. 
Independence of error means that the residual terms should be uncorrelated. It is tested for 
using the Durbin-Watson test. The Durbin-Watson test ranges from 0–4 with 2 implying 
uncorrelated residuals. If the value is above 2 it implies a negative correlation and values 
under two indicates a positive correlation (Field, 2009, p. 220-221). The Durbin-Watson test 
is presented in appendix 6 and the value 2.145 convinces me that the residuals are 
sufficiently close to 2 to not be a cause of concern.   
I also checked for multicollinearity and the results are displayed in appendix 7. 
Multicollinearity implies that variables are correlated with each other, and when this occurs 
it is hard to distinguish what variable is responsible for the effect seen on the dependent 
variable. VIF values over 10 and Tolerance values under .1 indicate collinearity between 
variables (Field, 2009, p. 224), which was not an issue in the models from table 1.  
Outliers have the potential to influence the results by greatly changing the line of best fit, 
but the exclusion of outliers is not unproblematic. Some researchers claim that excluding 
cases results in bias but others argue that in order to generalize results it is important that 
one or two influential cases does not completely steer the result (Field, 2009). Appendix 8 
displays the outlier plot from de jure transparency and environmental performance (with 
control variables). The average leverage value is calculated by the formula ((k+1)/n) where 
k is the number of predictors and n is the number of observations. If no case exerted undue 
leverage over the results all values should lie close to the average leverage value. Cases that 
are twice the average value should be investigated further (Field, 2009, p.217). The average 
leverage value in the plot of appendix 8 is ((7+1)/44)=.18, and most of the cases should 
therefore revolve around that value. The cases that need further investigation should 
therefore have leverage values of .18×2=.36. Five countries had leverage values higher than 
.36 but removing the cases did not greatly affect the results of the regressions, which is why 
they were left for the analysis. Cook’s Distance is used to examine whether cases exert 
undue influence over the results and Cook & Weisberg have proposed that values above 1 
should be investigated further, to evaluate whether these cases are candidates for deletion. 
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Cook’s Distance can be used to examine data on a case by case basis to detect if one case has 
a profound influence over the results (Field, 2009, p. 217). The amount of influence of cases 
can be seen on the Y-axis in appendix 8, and in this graph no case stands out as an outlier.   
There after I performed the same diagnostics but with ATI and CO2 (including control 
variables). Appendix 9 displays a leverage plot with potential outliers. Calculating the 
average leverage value and investigating countries with values twice as high presented five 
outliers; Norway, Tajikistan, Thailand, India and Dominican Republic. Again, I examined 
the effect of excluding the cases, but since they didn’t affect the interpretation of the results 
they were left in the analysis. Cook’s Distance was calculated for United States, but the value 
of .469 was too low to cause any concern.  
In the diagnostics check regarding the QoG index and environmental performance 
(including control variables) I also detected some outliers. Again, calculating the average 
leverage value (=.16) and multiplying it by two (=.32), three potential outliers with high 
leverage values were distinguished (see appendix 10). Norway, Mozambique and Russia had 
values greater than .32. Deleting these outliers did not change the result of the regressions 
in table 4 meaningfully and the only variable that was significant in model 3 (model 
containing all variables) was log GDP per capita and it is significant even without the 
countries with high leverage values. Egypt also stood out as an outlier with potentially high 
influence on the model, but calculating Cook’s Distance for this case displayed it had a value 
of .176 which is below the critical value 1 where deletion should be considered (Field, 2009, 
p. 217). 
Moving on to the QoG index and CO2 (including control variables) (appendix 11) the same 
problems with outliers were detected. The average leverage value was .18 and the critical 
value was .18*2= .37. Five countries had leverage values over .37; India, Norway, 
Mozambique, Kazakhstan and Algeria. The deletion of these variables did not significantly 
alter the results in table 5 and was therefore left for the analysis. Cook’s Distance was again 
calculated for United States but since the value .890 again escaped the critical value of 1 
United States was left in the analysis.  
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8. Discussion 
This section will discuss and conclude the results of the thesis and I will therefore go 
through the research questions and hypotheses one at a time and discuss them in regard to 
both transparency de jure and de facto in an attempt to provide an answer.   
According to the results, transparency, both de jure and de facto, has no independent effect 
on environmental performance. Regarding hypothesis 1a there was no correlation between 
the existence and strength of de jure transparency and environmental performance. The fact 
that ATI laws correspondingly displayed no correlation with de facto transparency was also 
quite telling and the policy implications from the results are important to consider. ATI 
laws are promoted both to ensure transparency but also environmental performance and 
according to the results presented here such a promotion is futile. The mere existence of 
access to information laws does not imply 1) that de facto transparency is reached, or 2) that 
the laws are implemented well enough to strengthen environmental performance. This null 
result therefore seriously calls into question policy strategies to enhance environmental 
performance that build on ATI legislation. One such strategy is adopted by the EU where 
legislation on access to information is the first step towards fulfilling the commitments 
under the Aarhus Convention to reach enhanced environmental performance. According to 
the results generate here the mere legislation on access to information will not generate 
actual substantive effects on the environment. In order to strengthen the results or explore 
other possible relationships, an investigation of ATI laws over time would be beneficial. 
There might be a time gap before ATI laws can be said to have a positive effect on the 
environment. Nevertheless, with the results generated from this thesis we cannot accept 
hypothesis 1a. 
Hypothesis 1b received some support in model 1, table 4, where de facto transparency had a 
significant and seemingly substantial impact on environmental performance. The result, 
however, did not hold with the inclusion of control variables (even when excluding log GDP 
per capita) which means that hypothesis 1b is not accepted. The null result regarding de 
facto transparency is also important since international treaties, such as the Aarhus 
Convention or the Paris Agreement, includes transparency as a key component to 
strengthen environmental performance (UNECE, n.d; Martini, 2016). According to the 
results transparency in itself will not be able to generate stronger environmental 
performance. Regarding the theoretical rationale for the success of transparency it might be 
beneficial to consider the fact that even if transparency decreases the information asymmetry 
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between the principals and the agents that does not mean the information can and will be 
used by principals to demand change. The results generated does not prove principal-agent 
theory wrong but it calls into question the reliance on the theoretical rationale for the 
success of transparency and generates questions regarding what other factors that need to 
accompany transparency. As argued by Gupta & Mason (2014), transparency seems to have 
escaped scrutiny with regards to environmental governance and normative and theoretical 
rationales seems to dominate the field. The results of my research demonstrate that empirics 
and theory does not always agree. Connecting to the theories of the effectiveness of 
transparency, the results of my research questions the disciplinary effect of transparency, as 
presented in the sunshine is the best disinfectant theory/targeted disclosure. To simply 
make mismanagement of environmental resources open to public access does not translate 
into governments, companies and citizens acting in a more socially desirable way to improve 
environmental performance. So, to clearly answer the main research question: transparency, 
both de jure and de facto, has no independent effect on environmental performance.  
Moving on to the indirect effect of transparency and the question of whether the effect runs 
through corruption the results are somewhat inconclusive. Regarding de jure transparency 
there was no opportunity to investigate the potential indirect effect since de jure 
transparency was not significantly connected to environmental performance to begin with. 
Concerning de facto transparency hypothesis 2 received some support. In table 4 model 1 
transparency displayed a significant impact on environmental performance until the 
inclusion of control of corruption in model 2, where all significance vanished. The 
robustness test using the information transparency index and environmental performance 
also provided some support for the theory of the indirect effect (appendix 3, model 1 & 2). I 
would therefore argue that hypothesis 2 receives some support, with regards to de facto 
transparency, but the results do not hold when controls are added. Since transparency is not 
significantly affecting environmental performance with the inclusion of control variables I 
could not get further with this research question. The results however display that when 
transparency does not bleed conceptually into other areas there is no independent effect on 
environmental performance, which goes against the study conducted by Halkos & Tzeremes 
(2014). 
The results of this research are unable to provide consistent support for any of the 
hypotheses concerning the interactions. Considering both de jure and de facto transparency 
the results were insignificant. However, with the removal of log GDP per capita as a control 
variable I was able to generate significant results of all the interactions with regards to de 
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facto transparency (table 4). As have been discussed, there exists a strong theoretical link 
between transparency and enhanced environmental performance and this thesis have 
investigated whether transparency can be effective on its own. Since this is not the case it is 
important to explore what factors that have the potential to enable theory to become 
practice. Since there is some support for civil society and trade openness to enhance the 
effect of transparency these factors would gain from being investigated further. The answer 
to the research questions concerning the enabling factors, based on the data and variables 
used, is no. However, the limitations regarding access to data concerning civil society, and 
the fact that the interactions were significant with the exclusion of GDP per capita points to 
further investigation. Nevertheless, it might be beneficial to investigate institutional factors 
with the potential to strengthen principals since socioeconomic factors were insufficient. 
8.1 Ways Forward  
Since an inadequate amount of research on the actual effects of transparency on 
environmental performance has been conducted, this dissertation is an important first step in 
uncovering what other factors need to be present in order for transparency to have desired 
effects. This thesis has investigated whether transparency has an independent effect on 
environmental performance and, if not, what factors are needed to create or enhance an 
effect. This essay has merely suggested some potential factors that could have enhanced the 
effect of transparency but the factors explored might not be the most appropriate. Future 
research should direct attention towards the specific surroundings that enable transparency 
to reach its ambitious promise, such as institutional factors. Since the main theory behind 
the success of transparency in creating accountability is principal-agent theory, the enabling 
factors that constituted my interactions were focused on the presence and strength of 
principals. An engaged citizenry is more likely to demand information, an educated citizenry 
has a higher potential of interpreting information and openness to trade offers the possibility 
of more principals. Nevertheless, future research should examine not only the non-state 
factors that might enhance the transformative potential of transparency, but also factors 
related to the state itself. Bureaucratic capacity could for example be investigated as an 
interaction with transparency. High bureaucratic quality would most likely strengthen the 
implementation of de jure transparency and increase the level of de facto transparency by 
efficiently responding to citizens’ requests for information. 
A final consideration for future research concerns the production of better data. Measuring 
societal phenomenon is challenging and more and improved data is imperative for future 
research. The attempts of scholars over recent years to measure transparency de facto has 
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produced both thin and noisy measures, but regarding the environmental sphere further 
measurements are needed that specifically address transparency concerning environmental 
information. Future research would then have the potential to uncover the specific needs for 
environmental improvement.  
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Appendices  
Appendix 1 – Pearson’s Correlation between ATI score and Environmental Performance Index  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 – QoG index and interactions with an exclusion of log GDP per capita 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ATIscore Environmental 
Performance Index 
ATIscore Pearson Correlation 1 -,203 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,054 
N 95 91 
Environmental Performance 
Index 
Pearson Correlation -,203 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,054  
N 91 168 
DV: 
Environmental 
Performance 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
IV: QoG index 6.595 (4.351) -.267 (2.374) .083 (2.304) 
Trade Openness -9.921* (4.576) -11.763** (4.079) 26.845 (14.826) 
Electoral Democracy -3.427 (5.658) .838 (4.414) 1.863 (4.321) 
Average years of schooling 
for males and females (25+)  
-13.599* (5.611) 21.890 (15.482) -10.362** (3.689) 
Meritocratic recruitment  4.892 (2.514) 4.284* (1.663) 4.245* (1.614) 
Gas Exports .000 (.050) .004 (.047) .025 (.045) 
Engaged Civil Society 41.087* (18.253)   
QoG * Civil Society -8.621* (4.072)   
QoG * Education  -9.496* (4.242)  
QoG * Trade Openness   -11.164** (3.983) 
Constant 15.056 47.656*** 45.502*** 
R2 ..637 .573 .597 
N 34 50 50 
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 Appendix 3 – Robustness test with Information Transparency and Environmental Performance 
Index 
 
Appendix 4 – Robustness test with Information Transparency and Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
DV: 
Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
IV: Information 
Transparency  
.108*** (.011) .130*** (.015) .028 (.061) -.034 (.105) .028 (.061) -.039 (.067) 
Trade Openness   .867 (.809) .253 (.844) 1.039 (.839) -11.879 (6.382) 
Electoral Democracy   .407 (.772) .247 (.912) .422 (.775) -.066 (.778) 
Log average GDP per 
capita 
  .425 (.329) .020 (.425) .431 (.330) .438 (.316) 
Average years of 
schooling for males and 
females (25+)  
  .947 (.693) -.352 (1.001) -4.956 (7.178) .439 (.713) 
Meritocratic 
recruitment  
  .054 (.306) .652 (.409) .015 (.311) .169 (.300) 
Gas Exports   -.021 (.009) -.021* (.008) -.019* (.009) -.020* (.009) 
Control of Corruption  -.482* (.198)     
Engaged Civil Society    6.421 (7.450)   
InfoTrans * Civil 
Society 
   -.099 (.100)   
InfoTrans * Education     .088 (.107)  
InfoTrans * Trade 
Openness 
     .193 (.096) 
Constant 2.823*** 1.413 4.198 11.471 4.343 9.133 
R2 .385 .404 .252 .430 .266 .328 
N 148 147 45 31 45 45 
DV: 
Environmental 
Performance 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
IV: Information 
Transparency  
.899*** (.064) .509*** (.074) .362 (246) .373 (.444) .365 (.249) .464 (.290) 
Trade Openness   -4.679 (3.201) -1.323 (3.792) -4.775 (3.283) 13.517 (27.066) 
Electoral Democracy   -2.346 (2.902) -5.051 (4.332) -2.374 (2.939) -2.093 (2.944) 
Log average GDP per 
capita 
  8.743*** (1.356) 8.942*** (2.078) 8.741*** (1.371) 8.763*** (1.364) 
Average years of 
schooling for males and 
females (25+)  
  .279 (2.813) .409 (4.030) 5.710 (30.896) .891 (2.971) 
Meritocratic 
recruitment  
  -.807 (1.162) -.125 (1.678) -.787 (1.180) -.928 (1.182) 
Gas Exports   -.022 (.032) -.032 (.033) -.023 (.032) -.019 (.033) 
Control of Corruption  7.700*** (.971)     
Engaged Civil Society    -22.991 (35.236)   
InfoTrans * Civil 
Society 
   .369 (.474)   
InfoTrans * Education     -.081 (.461)  
InfoTrans * Trade 
Openness 
     -.272 (.402) 
Constant -4.134 20.418*** -40.514* -48.022 -40.748* -48.163* 
R2 .540 .664 .815 .842 .815 .817 
N 168 166 52 35 52 52 
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Diagnostics - ATI and Environmental Performance Index 
Appendix 5 - Residual plot checking for heteroscedasticity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 6 – Durbin-Watson test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Mode
l R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 ,895a ,800 ,762 6,631 ,800 20,630 7 36 ,000 2,145 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Trade openness dummy divided 50/50 , Education dummy split at mean, ATIscore, ross_gas 
divided by hundred million, Mean index of meritocratic recruitment, Electoral democracy index, Log Average GDP 
b. Dependent Variable: Environmental Performance Index 
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Appendix 8 – Leverage plot displaying potential outliers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 7 – Multicollinearity  
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -24,915 18,010  -1,383 ,176   
ATIscore ,024 ,063 ,047 ,388 ,701 ,656 1,524 
Electoral democracy 
index 
-1,682 8,411 -,023 -,200 ,843 ,729 1,371 
Log Average GDP 9,581 1,987 ,798 4,823 ,000 ,353 2,832 
Mean index of 
meritocratic recruitment 
-,484 1,675 -,042 -,289 ,775 ,448 2,233 
Education dummy split at 
mean 
-2,015 4,686 -,047 -,430 ,670 ,827 1,210 
Trade openness dummy 
divided 50/50 
-6,257 5,254 -,144 -1,191 ,243 ,658 1,521 
ross_gas divided by 
hundred million 
-,016 ,042 -,038 -,368 ,715 ,928 1,078 
a. Dependent Variable: Environmental Performance Index 
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Diagnostics - ATI and Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
Appendix 9 – Leverage plot displaying potential outliers  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagnostics – QoG and Environmental Performance Index 
Appendix 10 – Leverage plot displaying potential outliers  
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Diagnostics – QoG and Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
Appendix 11 – Leverage plot displaying potential outliers  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagnostics – Williams Information Transparency and Environmental Performance Index 
Appendix 12 – Leverage plot displaying potential outliers 
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Average leverage value = .15. 15*2=.30. 4 outliers have high leverage values (Tajikistan, 
Norway, Dominican Republic and Russia). Deleting these cases did not affect the results of 
annex 3, which is why they were left in the analysis. Egypt was also detected as an outlier 
with a potential high influence on the results but its value from Cook’s Distance, .176, was 
not a cause for concern.   
Appendix 13 - Leverage plot displaying potential outliers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Average leverage value = .17. .17*2=.35. 3 outliers have high leverage values (Tajikistan, 
Norway, Dominican Republic). Deleting these cases did not affect the results in annex 4, 
which is why they were left in the analysis.  
 
 
 
 
